Sunday, April 01, 2012

Guess who's coming to vote? posted by Richard Seymour

BBC to Galloway: will you represent Muslims or the white working class? Labour to press: we have a problem with incorrigibly reactionary Muslims voting for left-wing Catholics, or with the incorrigibly reactionary white working class who won't vote for a Muslim candidate. Salma Yaqoob:

The fact that Respect won in every ward in the constituency, and won by a massive 10,000 majority, testifies that that disillusionment goes way beyond the Muslim community. In the predominately white, middle-class ward of Clayton approximately 900 votes were cast for Respect compared to 40 for Labour.

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Monday, May 02, 2011

A Note on New Labour and trasformismo posted by Richard Seymour

A while ago I wrote of Labour's "aim to represent and convoke the working class as an agency for reform" while also governing in the interests of capital. I received a missive shortly after this, urging me to go further. "This is the sort of thing that could have been written forty years ago," my correspondent suggested (I paraphrase), but "I'm not sure it does exactly this any longer." Indeed, it was written forty years ago - I was quoting more or less directly from Stuart Hall's Policing the Crisis.

Recently, proceeding through a catalogue of Gramscian writing on New Labour, I found a few pieces which might help update the picture. One was by Hall ('New Labour’s Double-shuffle', The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 27:319–335, 2005), another by Will Leggett ('Prince of Modernisers: Gramsci, New Labour and the meaning of modernity', in Mark McNally & John Schwarzmantel, eds, Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and resistance, Routledge, 2009). Both read New Labour as a particular hegemonic project operating within neoliberalism, but with a specific accent that distinguishes it from simple re-heated Thatcherism. This accent derives from the specific social basis of New Labour as "a social democratic government trying to govern in a neo-liberal direction, while maintaining its traditional working-class and public sector middle-class support". New Labour is a "hybrid regime" comprising a dominant neoliberal strand and a subordinate social democratic strand, and the latter is constantly being "transformed" into the former (Hall).

The New Labour vanguard had been forged in conjuncturally specific circumstances, but its import was epochal. So, while New Labour represented an adaptation to a profound, organic, long-term shift in the global patterns of capital accumulation, the agency within Labourism that forced this adaptation through was cultivated in the 'party modernization' process of the 1980s which was ideologically signposted by the sociological arguments progenerated by Marxism Today - ironically, as Leggett points out, the very current of analysis with which Hall was closely associated. This analysis held that the processes at work in contemporary capitalism were rendering traditional forms of social democratic collectivism obsolete. Labourism had to respond to this fact if it was to win another election. Hall was not one of those who uncritically celebrated this situation - far from it, in fact - but the 'New Times' orthodoxy played a key role in justifying Kinnock's purges of the Left, and his rightist lurches. From this tendency emerged some of New Labour's organic intellectuals, such as Geoff Mulgan. 'Third Way' politics is unthinkable without this prior ideological ground-work.

So, what did the Third Way seek to do? A key term in Hall's critique of Third Way politics is 'transformism' (trasformismo), a concept which operates at a certain level of abstraction while retaining a certain concreteness. That is to say, it is a highly descriptive term, referring to a technique of governance employed by the centre during and after the Italian Risorgimento, in which radical-popular social goals are incorporated and 'transformed' by the political centre, enabling a bourgeois hegemonic bloc to carry through a 'passive revolution' without empowering subaltern classes. Yet, it can be abstracted to a limited extent, deployed - with due care - to other situations. In the case of New Labour, transformism takes the form of "a long-term strategy" to transform "social democracy into a particular variant of free-market neo-liberalism". (Hall) This entails efforts to "co-opt, fragment, and dilute oppositional
actors and demands" (Leggett) This can be seen discursively in the energetic New Labour attempts to cast their agenda in terms of the legacy of the Attlee government, the 'socialism' of Richard Crossman, etc. NHS privatization reforms are, pace Blair, "firmly within Labour’s historic battle for social justice", fully consistent with Bevan's original agenda. If this looks like evasive double-talk, it's because it is: spin is not incidental to the New Labour project, but actually central to its hegemonic operations.

The antagonism within New Labour, between its neoliberal leadership and the basis in organised labour, is what explains the tendency to resort to vacillating jargon, queen among whose cynosures is 'pragmatism':

"The key thing to say about New Labour is that its so-called ‘pragmatism’ is the English face it is obliged to wear in order to ‘govern’ in one set of interests while maintaining electoral support in another. It isn’t fundamentally pragmatic, any more than Thatcherism was—which doesn’t mean that it isn’t constantly making things up on the run. In relation to the NHS, Mrs. Thatcher too was pragmatic in the short run (‘‘The NHS is safe in our hands!’’), yet strategically an anti-pragmatist (the internal market). As with the miners, she knew when to withdraw in order to fight again, more effectively, another day. Pragmatism is the crafty, incremental implementation of a strategic programme—being flexible about the way you push it through, giving ground when the opposition is hot, tactically revising your formulations when necessary (having given us ‘the enabling state’ and the celebration of ‘risk,’ the distinguished Third Way guru, Anthony Giddens (2002), now effortlessly slips us on to the forgotten problem of equality (!!) and ‘the ensuring state’—as more businesses absolve themselves of their pensions obligations). Pragmatism requires modestly shifting the emphases to catch the current political wind, saying what will keep traditional ‘heartland’ supporters happy (‘‘It can come across a bit technocratic, a bit managerial’’—the P.M.), whilst always returning to an inflexible ideological baseline (‘‘. . . the fundamental direction in which we are leading the country is correct’’—the P.M.)." (Hall)

Pragmatism, alongside 'modernisation', served to give the impression that New Labour policy nostrums were natural, uncontestable, and inevitable, though they were none of these things. These were hegemonic strategies, designed to give moral and intellectual leadership, and fundamentally alter the 'common sense' of political discourse, rationalising production and producing a new 'collective man' (cf, 'Americanism and Fordism'). This new 'collective man' is "not to expect handouts from the state, but is to be flexible, hard-working, entrepreneurial and a good consumer: a citizen-consumer". (Leggett) Labour could have won an election and governed as a moderately left-of-centre reformist party, but the Blairites were intent on fighting within public opinion, particularly within Labour's base, for their social agenda, which centrally involved turning social justice, poverty-reduction and public service delivery - traditional social democratic concerns - into aspects of neoliberal governance. For that reason, the 'activist state' - involving not Keynesian corporatism, but rather a plethora of marketised institutions that deliberately blurred the boundaries between the state and civil society - was crucial to the New Labour lexicon.

But New Labour's transformism would not have been effective at a discursive level of it weren't for occasional concessions to progressive, democratising values at the level of policy. These included the minimum wage, the devolution of powers, the working families' tax credit, some limited trade union rights, the human rights act, increased maternity leave, and - importantly - the expansion of public services through the very neoliberal means that it sought to normalise in the terrain of social democracy. Without these sorts of measures, the efforts at transforming social democracy into neoliberalism - which, recall, depended on coopting, fragmenting and diluting oppositional actors and demands - would not have been as effective as they were. Such measures disoriented and disorganised opposition, allowing the "fundamental direction" to remain untouched.

The remaining question is exactly how much success New Labour enjoyed in this hegemonic mission. It has been noted by pollsters that the experience of New Labour government moved the electorate to the right on a whole series of social questions, on egalitarianism, wealth redistribution, welfare, and - not the least of these - nationality, immigration and citizenship. The limits of this shift, however, are clear when it comes to popular attitudes regarding the core institutions of social democracy which New Labour sought to fundamentally restructure. Privatization did not become more popular with the electorate, and the Left organised some decent, effective public campaigns on this issue, around the railways, the tube, housing and hospitals. New Labour worked most effectively here where it divided and coopted the opposition. Pro-imperialist ideology, and support for the thermonuclear-tipped Anglo-American alliance that was central to New Labour's mission, sharply declined. Any Labour leader who advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1980s would have been crucified; today, he might be feted by a decent majority of the electorate. Dirigiste sentiments seem to have remained relatively stable among Labour voters, probably increasing as a result of the crisis. Most importantly, New Labour's electoral viability, and thus its ability to make its programme effective, is at rock bottom. Labour might be able to win another election as New Labour, but this would only be effective for as long as no strong opposition emerged. It certainly couldn't work in Scotland or Wales, where alternative reformists forces are already able to run rings around any Labour leadership that disappoints its base.

An emerging trend in New Labour thinking that is not quite Blairism, and doesn't entirely pivot on the moral and political individualism typical of the latter at its apex, is this 'Blue Labour' trend. Its key spokesperson, Lord Maurice Glasman, is a student of Karl Polanyi, and among its supporters are communitarians like Jon Cruddas. It remains, for that, a trend within New Labour, supported by pro-market ultras like James Purnell, which aims at upholding the basic New Labour assault on traditional social democratic collectivism: the language of mutualism, for example, provides a way of doing so without departing from neoliberal nostrums, and indeed any trend that comes from within New Labour will uphold a variant of neoliberalism. (Here I can't assent to Leggett's suggestion that New Labour possesses the intellectual resources to provide an alternative to neoliberalism). In an era when the majority are expected to accept severe reductions in their living standards, the figure of the acquisitive, self-interested individual that motivated Blairite transformism is no longer adequate or even minimally realistic. Instead, we are required to do more with less, to be self-sacrificing for what is ostensibly the greater good, to hold society together even while the mechanisms of social solidarity are de-funded and eviscerated. Hence, any potentially hegemonic formation within New Labour would have to proffer some 'Third Way' between atomised individualism and social democratic collectivism. It would have to go further, however, as it could not secure consent for a modified austerity project without offering some targeted concessions and relief, and without some modest encroachments on the wealth of the richest. Yet, to even state this is to underline just how weak and unstable such a project would be, how much more obvious its antagonisms would be, and how much less efficient its hegemonic operations would be as a result.

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Sunday, November 14, 2010

Historical Materialism on the 'Big Society' posted by Richard Seymour

Well, that was interesting. You can view the transcript of my talk below this post, but the debate deserves to be outlined, little as I can do it real justice. Nicola Livingstone of Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh opened with a discussion of charity, specifically retail charity, in an attempt to theorise its role within late capitalism, so that we can better understand the kinds of organisation that the government supposedly wants to deliver public services.

The argument traced the development of retail charity from the salvage shops in poorer districts in the 1800s, through the launch of Oxfam, to the professionalised and 'profit-maximising' organisations of today. They have become very marketing conscious, and the proliferation of high street branches - increasingly in wealthy areas, where most volunteers can be attracted to work, and most revenues raised - is an aspect of this development, as retail shops are an efficient way of raising funds. Charity itself becomes commodified, as it is in the consumption of retail goods that one expresses social solidarity.

Based on voluntary labour, the organisations work - so it is argued - not by extracting value from the volunteers, but by using the volunteers to realise the exchange value in the merchandise itself. The volunteers themselves are typically not in employment. Only 5% of volunteers are in full-time employment, with the bulk either retired or unemployed. They also tend to be on lower incomes, with most on under £15,000 per year. There are antagonistic relations between managers and workers, the former under enormous pressure to get the most out of the volunteers with few resources. The workers have more leverage than in the typical capitalist firm, in that they are compelled neither by economics or direct coercion to be there.

When asked why they volunteer, a typical answer involves "giving something back to society", though it is never clear what exactly is being given. Another common phrase is "conscience salving". There is no particular attachment to any one charity. Most volunteers choose the retail charity outlet nearest to them. There is little questioning of the framework in which the charitable act takes place, how effective it is, what might be better than charity... certainly, there is little questioning of the capitalist social relations that make it necessary that some should give up their free time. These are organisations that, one would gather, are ill-equipped to run public services. Voluntary labour is no replacement for waged labour, and commodified "conscience-salving" is no substitute for social solidarity.

Marina Kaneti (I didn't get what institution she was from, but I think this is her), then gave a talk completely in contrast to the above, arguing that social entrepreneurs are not necessarily co-opted by capitalism, and can act as an oppositional force, challenging the structure in some ways. Arguing from Mike Davis' Planet of Slums, Kaneti argued that there were large parts of the world that were 'radically excluded' from the capitalist economy, where the activities of big populations do not feed into capital accumulation or generate profit. Among these would be the slum-dwellers who numbered 921 millon in 2001, and will number 2 billion by 2030.

It is in these areas that social entrepreneurs can build, channelling people's creativity, changing social patterns, impacting the structures of the system - and this, she maintained, does not have to be coopted by capitalism. To back up this point, she cited the patron of social entrepreneurs (and old Reaganite arch-capitalist), William Draper, pointing out that social entrepreneurs solve social problems, not economic problems. They engage in non-market activities to improve lives. They allow for local empowerment, and capability-development that may be able to elude capitalist enclosure. A short video clip from one of those TED talks was shown to illustrate the point. The 'Blackberry' logo appeared on screen, then a rather lively host with a headset spoke from a vast stage, inviting a guest to join him from the floor. The man, William Kambwamba, was from Malawi, and he had become a 'social entrepreneur' by building a windmill from instructions in a book found in a nearby library run by USAID. The story is, he just had this idea of building a windmill to electrify his home, so went looking for the information, found it, and built it with the materials available to him. He was eventually able to power his local community with the assistance of overseas investors.

I didn't agree with the talk, and I was squirming at the video. I thought it was patronising, racist rubbish. It was like an Israeli foundation getting a Palestinian to talk about social activism without mentioning the occupation. There was no mention of the famine which drove his father's farming business into the ground, the Washington Consensus which contributed to the famine, or the privatised secondary and tertiary education system which meant that Kambwamba could not afford to continue school. The whole semiotics of the clip was appalling, with the presenter smarmily gushing, and the audience whooping and hollering, and no mention of the social context in which this 'entrepreneurialism' took place - just this atomised individual, devoid of political views or any relationship to Malawi's trade unions or socialist left, which would be challenging capitalism in different ways. (And, by the way, Kambwamba does have a view on imperialism, the IMF, neoliberalism, exploitation, and so on.) I really disliked it. I think it's fair to say most of the audience did as well, as someone complained to me afterward that people were rather unfairly aggressive toward Marina.

On the other hand, John Holloway, speaking from the floor, loved the presentation. He was very enthusiastic about it, seeing it as an excellent antidote to the idea of marxism as a 'theory of domination', which I suppose he saw reflected in the presentations by Nicola Livingstone and myself. He argued that marxism had to be a theory of antagonism, and the key antagonism in capitalism is between use value and exchange value, between abstract and concrete labour. The key antagonism of capitalism, then, centres on despair, frustration and alienation, and social entrepreneurs by unleashing our capabilities can help overcome this. I was neither surprised nor particularly moved by this, considering...

Anyway, here's my talk:

Thoroughly Modern Tories? From 'One Nation' to 'The Big Society'
Richard Seymour

In search of tradition
The Tories have a habit of justifying whatever they’re doing in terms of an ancestral tradition, of which they are the legatees. Some examples. When Sir Robert Peel, in effectively founding the modern Conservative Party, embraced industrial capitalism and the Great Reform Act of 1832, he signalled his acceptance of the new order with the ‘Tamworth Manifesto’. It is a rather dull document to read, written for a bye-election. But it acknowledged the reform as both “a final and irrevocable settlement of a great constitutional question” and at the same time as nothing more than a “careful review” of existing institutions to root out “abuses”, the better to preserve “ancients rights” and “deference to prescriptive authority”.

When Benjamin Disraeli led the Tories toward the Second Reform Act of 1867, which enfranchised a section of the working class, he asserted that the 1832 Act had “abolished all the franchises of the working class” which were “as ancient as those of the Baronage of England”. Thus, adapting to mass democracy was not a reluctant last-ditch embrace of reform to mitigate its effects and claim its benefits, but the restoration of a tradition which the Tories had, mysteriously, forgotten about. Embracing the ideology of social reform, Disraeli asserted that raising up the condition of the people was one of the three pillars of the Tories’ historic mission. Stanley Baldwin, in turn, embracing certain fledgling forms of welfare and palliation, grounded his appeal in a ‘One Nation’ tradition going back all the way to Disraeli. Harold Macmillan, embracing social democracy, asserted that Toryism is nothing other than “paternal socialism”. He harked back to Disraeli. The New Right, whose rise coincided with some fresh thinking on Disraeli found that they were able to claim him as an ancestor too. And of course, David Cameron, positioning himself as a quasi-egalitarian, a social reformer concerned with poverty, considers himself an advocate of Tory radicalism in the tradition of Benjamin Disraeli.

There is in fact no coherent tradition here, no unbroken lineage that resolves the many turbulent shifts of official Tory doctrine and practise into a solid body of accumulated wisdom. There are constant commitments – but these are not to tradition, and the familiar, as so many Tory apologists vouch. Whether opposing mass democracy or acquiescing to it, whether red-baiting social democrats or mimicking them, whether raising spending or cutting it, the enduring ideological commitment of the Conservative Party is to inequality, hierarchy and domination.

Or, to put it in less abstract terms, the capitalist mode of production, the system of Burke’s veneration, the system that made the Tory landowning class rich (for it was still largely an agrarian system when the Conservative Party first emerged in its modern form), and the system whose technological expansion made the Peel family rich, as they were original investors behind the spread of the ‘Spinning Jenny’. In the marxist idiom, the Conservative Party is a bourgeois party, a party that exists to wage political struggles on behalf of the capitalist class into which it is integrated. And if this is right, then the shifting orthodoxies of official Conservatism will not merely express the changing interests, composition and cohesion of the ruling class, but also its relations with the rest of society, its relative power with respect to the working class, and so on.

So, it is on that basis that I want to outline the patterns of the shift, from the post-war consensus to Thatcherism, and now the post-Thatcherite neoliberal consensus that has a near monopoly on our parliamentary system.

‘One Nation’
The Tories’ acceptance of the social democratic state, which Labour constructed out of the materials of the war state, was at first reluctant. Lord Hailsham’s famous warning to parliament at the height of war in 1943 urged that: “If you do not give the people social reform they are going to give you a social revolution.” This was a recognition that the war-making state had mobilised millions of workers in a collective effort, under the direction of a state that had showed that it could engage in planning. It was also a recognition of the radicalism that was sweeping the country during the war, something that Paul Foot describes in his posthumously published book, The Vote. But while social reform was on the agenda, it was no part of the Tories’ agenda in 1945 to deliver social democracy.

There was bipartisan agreement, coming out of the war, that there should be some form of social safety net. Capitalism would be re-organised to integrate a labour movement with a specifically reformist, anti-communist orientation into the institutions of government – a process that really began in the 1840s in response to the challenge of Chartism. Importantly, there is nothing inherent in the welfare state that ‘free market’ Tories should oppose. Its basis is liberal, rather than socialist. The Beveridge report, composed in 1942, out of the work of an obscure reconstruction committee, builds on the Liberal reforms of 1906. Welfare was not conceived of as an obligation of a society to its members, but a commodity, traded between contracting parties. It was intended to provide a subsistence-level minimum income rather than to fundamentally redistribute the balance of wealth and power. But the idea of economic planning, of a corporatist state with a set of nationalised industries at its core enabling the government to orchestrate demand, and integrating the demands of the working class through the absorption of the trade union bureaucracy, was fiercely opposed at first.

Nor did their subsequent experiences automatically change their opinions. If the scale of the defeat in 1945, halving the Tories’ parliamentary representation, reducing their share of the vote from 53.7% to 39.8%, briefly empowered those in the Conservative Party who wanted to move in the direction of some moderate industrial planning, by the time the Cold War was being launched in 1947, the Tories, led by Winston Churchill, had lapsed into a red-baiting crusade for capitalist freedom. Churchill vituperated that social democracy was a half-way house to communism. His allies and advisors, such as Oliver Lyttelton, argued –in ways that foreshadowed the ‘New Right’ – that planning of the economy must involve planning the lives of individuals, not just in Britain, but in all those countries that Britain traded with (or possessed as colonies). According to such early neo-liberal thought, planning was absurd, tyrannical and unworkable. The 1951 election was fought on the basis of opposing government intervention, denationalisation, restoring capitalist freedom. “Set the people free”, ran the slogan. And had the distribution of seats been proportionate to the vote, the Tories would have lost the election, as Labour consolidated its support with 48.8% of the vote – proving itself to have a durable electoral basis.

In office, very little was done to reverse Labour’s reforms. Planning was maintained, unemployment remained minimal, below half a million for 8 of 13 years of Tory rule, public spending was kept up, a few abridgments notwithstanding. Working class wages kept up with productivity – in fact, when it comes to incomes policies, workers tended to do slightly better under Tory than Labour administrations. The reasons for the Tories’ acquiescence are varied. Such planning as had been institutionalised was not planning in any strong, radical Keynesian sense, but in the weak sense of evening out imbalances in the economy and manipulating proportions of activity in accordance with an overall strategy. Such industries as had been nationalised had been handsomely recompensed, were important to the UK’s industrial performance, and it was not obvious that they would survive in the private sector. Above all, the Tories did not want to risk being turfed out again in 1955. It’s important to recall how terrified they were of losing their hegemonic position. They were very well aware of the urgent need to consolidate a mass base – a problem the Tories had faced since 1867, and which manifested itself after 1945 with a poll-driven strategy to win over the lower middle class and the ‘skilled’ working class. So the modernisers around Harold Macmillan were able to win the argument for social democracy.

This did not, to repeat an earlier point, signal the accession of some ‘One Nation’ tradition to the leadership. The ‘One Nation’ faction in the Tory party has never been identical with its paternalist ‘left-wing’. Its early members included reactionaries such as Enoch Powell and, later, Keith Joseph. Its recent advocates have included Thatcherites like Ian Duncan Smith. Acquiescence in the social democratic state was a conscious adaptation to the strength and cohesion of the working class as a political force, the challenge of socialism, the relative weakness of the British ruling class, and the new needs of British capitalism in an era of global decline and bipolar international competition. Accepting the social democratic state enabled the Tories to continue to act as a hegemonic party of capital. Studies of working class support for the Tories carried out in the Sixties tended to interpret it as deferential, but an important component of that elusive phenomenon was the belief that the Tories ‘looked after’ the working classes.

However, the corporatist instruments refined under Eden, Macmillan, and Douglas-Home were unable to protect British capitalism from a number of endemic problems. First of all, the relative decline of Britain could not be overcome by corporatist modernisation projects adopted by both Wilson and Heath. The public spending projects embraced in the Sixties and early Seventies actually tended to produce lame ducks. Capital was also finding it increasingly possible to sidestep social democratic constraints, partly because of increased international mobility – this problem was one of the reasons for the reformist Left’s attempt to produce a new settlement, the Alternative Economic Strategy which formed the basis of Labour’s 1974 general election strategy. Secondly, social democracy could not overcome the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and that tendency did begin to manifest itself in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Reduced profit rates meant lower private sector investment, slower growth, higher unemployment, and the beginnings of a crisis of the system. Lastly, corporatist institutions such as incomes policies, and repeated attempts at curbing the right to strike by both Labour and Tory administrations, could not contain labour militancy and wage claims. The explosion of radicalism, and the shop stewards movement, led to the second major crisis of the Tories’ ability to act as a hegemonic party, which the Heath administration crippled and ultimately broken by mass strikes. Out of this humiliating defeat, a combative new Right, eschewing the integument of social democracy, arose.

The restoration of capitalist freedom
Mrs Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party was seen by many big business advocates as a scandalous ideological deviation, a short sharp route to the dead end of being a middle class protest party, much as UKIP is today. There is an element of truth in this. There had been a growing revolt by the middle classes against high taxes since the Fifties. The ‘new Right’ that consolidated first around Powell and then Thatcher had its roots in the Freedom League and the Institute of Economic Affairs, and in the reactionary, petit-bourgeois rightist bedrock. Throughout the 1980s, moreover, the most solid Tories were the petit-bourgeoisie, 70% of whom consistently backed Thatcher – the only class to back Thatcher by a majority.

But the Hayekian doctrines guiding the Conservative leadership were not just the cri de coeur of the middle class. They contained a serious analysis of, and remedy for, the ‘British disease’. Powell had shown that it was possible for the Tories to build a mass base without accepting social democracy, by espousing an authoritarian politics of ‘the nation’ allied with economic liberalism –protecting national identity, restoring national competitiveness, asserting British national interests in Ireland and elsewhere, etc. But it would be no good doing so if the Tories could not by these self-same means effectively restore British capitalism and continue to act as a hegemonic party of capital. Since this ability was already in question, the Tory leadership was prepared to take a gamble on a radical new policy mix.

Thatcher knew that the corporatist state depended on healthy revenue streams, but that its ability to intervene and generate those revenue streams was by then seriously weakened. Higher public spending did not reduce unemployment. It just added to inflation. Price controls were ineffectual, and the ‘winter of discontent’ would later show that wage controls were just as ineffectual. Notably, it was during that period in 1978 that big business first rallied behind Thatcher in a major way. In their place, capitalist freedom would be restored. Collective bargaining was out, incomes policies and price controls were out, demand management and job-creation was out.

In the new neoliberal statecraft, the government would spend less, and such money as was spent would be channelled through market-based delivery mechanisms, and undemocratic bodies such as quangos. The boss of Sainsburys was brought in to write a report which led to the introduction of internal markets in the NHS, inflating administrative overheads dramatically. The major macroeconomic objective of government would be to control inflation, which meant controlling wages. That was to be achieved primarily through high unemployment, and a co-ordinated attack on the bargaining power of labour. Defeating the unions achieved this objective, of course, but it also had the intended effect of devastating the social forces best placed to resist Thatcher’s agenda and obstruct social democracy’s adaptation to the new order.

The rentier would be revived, and sound money would replace cheap money. The City’s speculative activities would drive capitalist investment by increasing the rewards of such investment, while integrating a section of the working class by allowing them to borrow against their property - which, owing to rationing in the provision of housing, would perpetually increase in value. Enough people would feel wealthy enough to form a viable political constituency in favour of the new settlement. Until about 1989, the politics of ‘the nation’ thus configured could command between 42 and 44% of the vote, a slight recovery from Ted Heath’s 1974 low of 35%, but still well below the post-war performance – in fact, votes of the Thatcher scale would have resulted in defeats in the 1950s and 1960s.

By the time of the poll tax riots, however, it was clear that Thatcherism could no longer command an electoral plurality. Not only that, but Thatcherite combativeness was exhausted as an option after the poll tax riots. The last major confrontation that the Tories risked with the labour movement, for example, was with the signal workers in 1993. The capitalist class threw hundreds of millions into supporting British rail in that dispute. The Institute of Directors and the CBI mucked in. But the strike was fairly solid, and the employers were defeated. This suggested that the militancy and cohesion had not been completely knocked out of the working class, and that the ruling class now had to turn to other means to get its way. Swinging behind New Labour was the main way it sought to do this. Some Tories lived in denial about this for years. They blamed John Major, and his pro-European allies for their difficulties. If he hadn’t joined the ERM, and been such a wet, the locomotive of the Thatcher revolution would still be charging through the polity today, they maintained. It took three successive election defeats, twice with hard right leaderships pandering to the petit-bourgeois base, saving the pound and stopping immigration, and all leaving the Tories with just over thirty percent of a shrinking vote, to disabuse them of this idea. The Tories had kept the petit-bourgeois base, but they had lost many of the skilled workers Cameron belongs to a faction of the Conservative Party that is loyal to Thatcher’s accomplishments, and has repeatedly paid verbal tribute to her legacy, but is realistic about the need to detoxify the Tory brand of those associations. And that’s how we get to the ‘Big Society’.

The Big Society
No one knows exactly what the ‘Big Society’ is. It is a childishly sunny locution, the sort of thing a children’s television presenter in dungarees and a stripy rainbow sweater might gush about. Before its emergence as an electoral talking point, though, Cameron was given to lachrymose jeremiads about the ‘broken society’. And if we look at the background to the ‘broken society’, it might disclose some of the contours of the ‘big society’. The first signs of the attempt to fashion a more ‘compassionate conservatism’ were evident under Ian Duncan Smith’s watch between 2001 and 2003. It was during this period, you’ll recall, that Theresa May warned Tories that they were seen as the “nasty party”.

The Tories believed that they had won the fight over the fundamentals of the free market economy, but now stood accused of being callous with it, of not having a compassionate social policy to complement their emphasis on capitalist efficiency. If anything, free market economics seemed most compatible with shameless elitism and social Darwinism. Keith Joseph’s bid for the Tory leadership against Ted Heath had floundered when he argued that “the balance of our population, our human stock, is threatened” by high birth rates among the underclass; and that greater birth control was needed to contain it. Post-Thatcherite social policy would have to obliterate all traces of such ideology in the public mind.

The trouble for the Conservatives was that despite their attacks on the welfare state while in office, despite under-funding the public sector, and despite various reforms intended to make the public sector more like the market, they had not succeeded in keeping overall spending down. One reason for this was that the high unemployment resulting from their economic policies drove up the cost of social security. The other plank of their policy designed to cope with just this problem was workfare. This involved changing the benefits structure to ‘reward work’ and introducing welfare-to-work schemes designed to change individuals’ capacity to find work in the labour market. Such policies made no lasting impact on employment, and thus did not reduce the social security bill. As far as the Tories were concerned, the tax bill that paid for public spending was still a drain on capitalist dynamism, and the further erosion of the welfare state was essential: it was just not politically popular.

Fortunately for the Tories, New Labour’s acceptance of the neoliberal policy mix extended to accepting workfare, privatization and fiscal austerity. This automatically drew the sting out of any attack on such policies from the centre-left, leaving only the question of how to define the Tory brand, creating the perception of ‘clear blue water’ between themselves and New Labour. Staking out a traditionalist stance on homosexuality, the family, drugs, and race was not an option – though in truth, Cameron did try in his early days as an MP to do just this, his latter day reinvention as a social liberal notwithstanding. It wasn’t popular, and it divided the Tories - beyond the old Tory ‘left-wing’, there were a section of Thatcherite ‘mods’ (as distinct from the ‘rockers’), who later became known as the Notting Hill set, who believed that market liberalism should lead logically to social liberalism on drugs, race, sexuality and so on. So, it transpired that the best strategy for the Tories was to become cloyingly touchy-feely in public, lock the old hard-nosed self-made Thatcherite bruisers in the coffin, and hug a hoody.

Under Ian Duncan Smith, the new dispensation declared that society did exist. The centrist Tory intellectual David Willets was put in charge of welfare policy, with a remit of discussing how amid general prosperity there was such terrible deprivation in parts of the country. But IDS could not carry his party over support for gay adoption, and was unceremoniously chucked in favour of the charismatic old hawk, Michael Howard, who stuck to an old hard right script. After the glorious Howard interregnum, Cameron took over the process of liberalisation. He was instructed to do so by Lord Ashcroft, whose money it was he was playing with. He talked up the party’s green credentials, and promised to stick to Labour’s spending commitments if elected. IDS’s think-tank, the ‘Centre for Social Justice’ set up in 2004, provided the soundtrack on social policy.

The ‘broken Britain’ spiel, developed in successive reports by the CSJ, argued that the problems of poverty, teen pregnancy, drug abuse, crime, ill health, and economic inactivity, were the result of cultural habits that needed to be broken with. These cultural habits made the society more unequal by creating an environment that deprived the ‘underclass’ of opportunity. To overcome these habits, and thus distribute opportunity more equally, it would be necessary to undertake a number of reforms that would boost social virtue: improve school discipline and expand school places by allowing charities, parents and voluntary organisations to set up new schools (that’s ‘free schools’); workfare, with a new set of incentives and penalties to make the benefits system less attractive and thus erode ‘welfare dependency’; tougher policing of anti-social behaviour, with higher sentencing for knife-crimes and such, to attack an important environmental obstacle to opportunity; and give more support to families through the welfare system in order to boost social cohesion. All of this would be accompanied by official encouragement of charities, social enterprises and NGOs, whose flourishing would help restore a lost social solidarity. That’s the ‘Big Society’.

I think it’s plain from this list that very little distinctive in the way of policy is being offered here. Almost all of it is continuous with New Labour, who in turn were faithfully following Thatcher. The state would continue to be rationalised and downsized at roughly the same pace as under New Labour, and the reforms to welfare and the public sector would be roughly as New Labour intended. What is distinctive is the branding, and the problem it was supposed to remedy. Cameron sought to situate himself as a ‘progressive’, interested in equality, someone who could be trusted not to utterly savage the public sector, and someone who was open to trade unions as a potential partner rather than a punching bag. And in fact, his leadership saw bye-elections where the Tory candidate outflanked New Labour to the left on Post Office closures. This effort was very costly, and the results were ideologically incoherent and diffuse. But it did contribute soften the Tories’ image and, for the first time since ERM and the 1992 miners’ strike, the Tories found themselves with a sustained lead over Labour, their support hovering around 40%.

The Tories’ decision to ‘turn nasty’ again, using the issue of the deficit and New Labour’s compliance with City demands that fiscal rectitude be restored at the earliest convenience, cost them electorally. That they could still only get just over a third of the vote with a weak incumbency amid the deepest crisis since the Depression says a great deal. Only a fraction of the skilled working class and professionals returned to them. They did not get a mandate, even in the terms of this gerrymandered electoral system. Nevertheless, the decision of Nick Clegg’s Liberals to ally with the Tories, helped along by an ad hoc set of ‘rules’ contrived by senior civil servants, helped overcome this problem and has probably done more to detoxify the Tory brand than all the ‘Big Society’ stuff. But all this raises an important point, which I’ll finish on.

Cameron’s leadership is operating in a situation in which two key difficulties beset the party’s ability to act as, as I say, a hegemonic party of capital. First is the secular tendency for its electoral base to decline, which is actually obscured a bit by the declining turnout, which is concentrated mainly among former Labour voters. The actual share of Tories among the total electorate may be closer to a quarter than a third. To overcome this, Cameron has had to triangulate, pacifying the core vote while appearing to offer something to the centre and centre-left. The second problem is the growing gap between the interests of the hard right base, the lower middle class, and those of the capitalist class, particularly the dominant financial fraction. This demands a second triangulation, though where there is a conflict, capital tends to win. If it did not, big business would withdraw its support and its funding. Cameron’s position on Europe – allying with the parties of the far right, while implementing the policy of big business – is typical of this strategy.

These two difficulties are combining to produce a long-term crisis for the Tories, notwithstanding their present lead in the polls (which isn’t usually greater than 5%). Thus, the reinvention of the ‘Big Society’ as a mantra for spending cuts, welfare cuts, and faster privatization, is part and parcel of a gamble by the Tory leadership that a repetition and further entrenchment of the Thatcher revolution will revive British capitalism and restore their position in it, as the dominant party of business. It is, as the students have shown, a gamble that has the potential to backfire horribly on them.

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Sunday, September 26, 2010

A few points about Ed Miliband's victory posted by Richard Seymour

Ed Miliband's victory is not a win for socialism. Ed is not red, whatever the Murdoch press and the Blairites say about him. As he himself says: "My dad, if he was alive, would be saying that the idea that my son is 'Red Ed' is not something he would [recognise]". Labourism is not going to become socialism. But, as Ed Miliband also says, the era of New Labour is over. That is a defeat for the majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the most right-wing section of the leadership, the supporters of the war on Iraq, the civil authoritarians in the Labour Party, the most anti-union Labourites, and the majority of the corporate media.

And it is a defeat inflicted by the trade union membership, which is beginning to rally itself for a fightback against the Tory cuts package. If they didn't want to sack the Blairites in this context, I think we'd have grounds for being deeply worried. As it is, I am still encouraged by this result, and I think it will give some more confidence to workers on the frontline organising against the cuts - particularly if, as I suspect may happen, Ed Balls becomes the shadow chancellor. This, for me, is what it's really about. The class struggle always plays out in the Labour Party in a particular way. The question is whether the labour movement is prepared to have a political leadership that is in many ways hostile to the organised working class, openly spurning the unions; or whether it wants a traditionally Labourist leadership that seeks to represent the working class politically while trying to reconcile its interests with those of 'the nation' - ie national competitiveness, ie capital. This is not an inconsequential difference for the working class. Unless there is a concrete, left-wing alternative to Labourism available to us, then the political project associated with Blairism - of replacing social democracy with bourgeois liberalism, in imitation of the US Democratic Party - was always going to be catastrophic for the working class. So, the defeat of Blairism is a step forward.

Sadly, the result also comes with a sour lesson in how weak the Labour Left is, as Diane Abbott actually received fewer votes than Andy Burnham. I know from bitter arguments online and in the flesh that many left-wing Labour members didn't support Diane, ostensibly on grounds that I think are preposterous - her son's private education came up a lot, as did her television appearances with Michael Portillo. In reality, I think these rationalisations had little to do with it. The Labour Left is still deeply demoralised, and scarred, by years of Blairism. It is also numerically depleted by the mass defections of the Blair era. Milibandism of the 'Ed' variety is their dipping their toes in some moderate waters which, if successful, might encourage them to become more adventurous later on.

The trouble is that, as one particularly astute Twitterer pointed out yesterday, the Labour Right is never going to accept the leadership of a trade union-friendly centre-left. They're already sending out signals of a bitter turf war that they're prepared to wage in the coming years, with the help of their contacts in the Murdoch papers. The slightest sign of any deviation from orthodoxy will be the subject of relentless flack and destabilisation. The capitalist media is already on the attack over trade union members determining the outcome of a leadership election - the idea that a future Prime Minister could owe his position to bolshy toilers offends their sensibilities. We need a strong Left, both inside and outside of the Labour Party, to keep pressure on the new leadership. Inevitably, Ed Miliband will let down his supporters, and he may not even survive the next five years. The question then will be whether the party comes back under the control of the Blairites, or whether the pressure from the rank and file keeps the right-wing on the back foot.

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Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Vince Cable attack on "capitalism" posted by Richard Seymour

It has come to a pretty pass when the most free market of free market liberals, the most hawkish, pro-austerity member of an austerity coalition, launches what is billed as a blistering attack on "capitalism". The planned speech is being widely described in the press as "left-wing rhetoric". Predictably, the CBI are reacting with feigned outrage, the Daily Heil insinuating that Cable might in fact be a closet Marxist, and the scum Express is leaping to the defence of free enterprise.

It's crap, of course. What Cable favours is a better regulated capitalism with a humbled financial sector, but he knows he can't even deliver that while he's a helpmeet to George Osborne, the trust fund chancellor who is one of the many millionaires in the Tory front bench, and who is committed to defending a robust, liberated financial sector. The "capitalism" that he impugns is a particularly rapacious form of financialisation, and I don't believe he's winning the policy arguments in the cabinet. Still, he feels he has to name and shame the system in a way that most bourgeois politicians haven't done for decades. Undoubtedly this is intended to staunch the flow of defecting voters, members and councillors, while re-asserting Cable's reputation as a sort of maverick - a reputation that has already been soiled and bloodied due to his involvement in this savage and unpopular austerity agenda. Undoubtedly, it is meant to reassure the dissenters that the 'instincts' of the Liberal leadership are still basically decent and socially conscious, and that they have not been captured by 'sectional' interests, ie those of capital.

Whether anyone buys it or not is almost secondary. That capitalism is a system that people acquiesce in and tolerate for want of an organised alternative is increasingly obvious. That the vast majority of people blame capitalists and bankers for the austerity agenda, more so than they blame anyone else, is also clear in the polls. The interesting thing will be how Labour MPs respond. I am certain that the reflex of most of the leadership candidates will be to defend "capitalism", and to complain about Cable's empty promises and to agree with Lord Turner that it's policy that counts not greed, etc etc. So it is that a right-wing, senior cabinet member in a hard right government perpetrating an unprecedented attack on the welfare state ends up saying what few social democrats have dared say since the defeat of the miners.

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Friday, September 03, 2010

New Labour myths again. posted by Richard Seymour

You'll remember this. Dan at The Third Estate points up a passage from the evil one's tractatus illogico-politicus: "Ed Balls was of the opinion that the public wanted even more spending and were prepared for the extra tax, by reference to polls that the Treasury had – which I said was nonsense. On these issues, the public fib." Two things. First of all, there's the trademark cynicism and contempt for "the public"*. Secondly, I am assured by people who were in the Labour Party circa 1992 that the conclusion many senior Labourites drew from the election results was indeed (perversely) that the public only pretends to favour higher taxes for better public services, and that we had become thoroughly Thatcherised during the 1980s. But I don't believe that anyone was really convinced by this.

As I point out in - oh, what's it called, now? - the psephological and polling evidence doesn't support this idea. The New Labour project, if it is to be judged purely on electoral terms - its preferred standard actually - didn't work. It was supposed to produce a new, broad electoral coalition that would anchor British politics to the centre-left for the long-term, and all it has done is reduce Labour's base. Blair's three election victories would have been impossible if it weren't for the sheer, enervated weakness of the opposition. Meanwhile, most voters have always rejected Thatcherism, or tried to when given the chance.

But the line that it was the public who were secret Tories provided a convenient, superficially plausible rationale for pursuing a project that Blair and Brown had already been attracted to by to during their visits to Australia and the United States - the same 'Third Way' idea that Labor and the Democrats were already putting into action. The attraction behind that project was simple: the old social democratic centre was finished, and the social forces to the left of centre were too weak and divided to sustain a more radical alternative. As Kinnock et al watched the big battalions of the working class get hammered by Thatcher, they had already decided that the era of social democratic corporatism was over. No electoral package that was not already approved by at least a fraction of big capital was possible - even if it could win an election, it couldn't be carried through in practise.

The populist rightist insurgency started by Powell in the Sixties and continued by Thatcher in the Seventies proved that it was possible for a right-wing government to work outside the social democratic settlement by espousing a new politics of 'the nation'. The Conservative Party was now not merely the party of growth, or of the efficient management of social democracy. It was the party of a strong Britannia, repelling immigrants, defending the Union with Ulster, asserting British interests overseas, protecting British families, fighting for a stable British currency and a robust British industry after all the lame duck inefficiencies of the corporatist era. Such was the ideological mix that helped the Tories lead the charge against the social democratic settlement. It had not only shifted a segment of public opinion, and defeated the embedded liberalism that was the dominant strain of opinion in the Tory Party since the Macmillan-Butler era. Most crucially, it had shifted the consensus within the ruling class. The 'rule Britannia' stuff no longer works as well as it did, of course (Blair never really grasped that the energy behind this politics of 'the nation' had utterly exhausted itself by the time he became Labour leader), which is why the Prime Minister is David Cameron and not Michael Howard. But it served its purpose.

There was every reason why that project might have failed at a number of points, notably in its risky contests with the organised labour movement. Had it done so, the idea of a Labour leader that was hostile to unions and the welfare state would have been impossible. The defeat of the miners, more than the electoral defeats of 1987 and 1992 which were partially a product of that tragedy, made it possible for New Labour to emerge. It produced the viper in the breast of Labourism known as Tony Blair. Blaming this monstrosity on "the public" and its propensity to lie about matters of taxation is moronic.

*Other examples of which: "The right-wing phrase, 'underclass', was ugly, but it was accurate ... [those at the bottom] had dysfunctional lives, full stop" (p. 204); "people might say they don't like conservatives, they still vote for them" (p. 556). [hat tip, Chris Brooke] And so interminably on, the reactionary talking points offered with the familiar, demented self-assurance. And don't even look at the stuff on Iraq, Abu Ghraib ("undoubtedly exceptional offences"), Gitmo (which he says was right in principle, if done differently), asylum, etc etc.

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Thursday, August 12, 2010

The collapse of the consensus, the myth of popular capitalism, and the 'new realism' posted by Richard Seymour

Some aspects of the cuts debate are continuing under my last rejoinder, which you might want to check out. I want to flesh out an important point regarding the mythologies about class and politics that became a New Labour mainstay. These include the myth that the majority had abandoned class consciousness, instead becoming 'aspirational', and as such had embraced core aspects of Thatcherism ('popular capitalism'), moved away from social democracy and were turned off by appeals to egalitarianism and public ownership.

That these are indeed myths, I will show in due course. But they have origins particularly in the right-wing lurch in the higher echelons of the trade union leadership and the Labour Party in the early 1980s, that was sometimes known then as 'the new realism'. They did not originate from within the labour movement, but rather are an adaptation to ideas developed by the right-wing of the Conservative Party since the late 1960s, and aggressively pushed by segments of the capitalist media, most famously represented by the Selsdon Group, a 'free market' pressure group set up by Nicholas Ridley in 1973. How they came to be currency in the right-wing of the labour movement has to do with the failure of the 1974-1979 Labour government.

I've written elsewhere of how the New Left emerged in response to the collapse of the post-war consensus. It coincided with the emergence of a radical left-wing leadership in the trade union movement, and the arrival of a militant shop stewards' movement. But what it did not do was feed into a movement to build an alternative to the Labour Party, as people like Ralph Miliband thought was necessary. The forces of the revolutionary left were too small, and the numbers of people on the left prepared to break with Labourism were insignificant. Rather, it fed into a surge in the Labour Left's fortunes, whose hopes were pinned on a Labour victory, delivered twice in 1974.

Let's consider the manifesto that Labour won on in February 1974, and again in October 1974. It included the commitment to price controls, a wealth tax, caps on rents, and protection for tenants against eviction. On health, it promised to abolish prescription charges and democratise local health authorities. On racism and imperialism, it promised to eliminate racist discrimination in nationality laws, end Britain's involvement with apartheid, and reduce defence spending. On industry and employment, it committed to an exansion of public control of industry including in profitable industries (socialising gains as well as losses), making existing nationalised industries more responsible to workers and users and properly "socialise existing nationalised industries" (interesting distinction). The 25 leading companies would be nationalised, according to the Alternative Economic Strategy upon which the manifesto was substantially based. It pledged to create a National Enterprise Board to further socialise industry, the intervention of the state and notably it pledged its support for "industrial democracy", wherein (as per the Labour Programme 1973) workers would have a direct representation through trade union channels in the management of industries.

Much of that programme owes itself to Tony Benn, who took on board the New Left's criticisms of social democracy, and urged the party leadership to move to the Left in order to win the election and effect a fundamental shift in the balance of wealth and power in British society, such that no government could feasibly turn it back without facing the resistance of a powerful grassroots democracy. It is fair to say that he over-estimated the ability of a Labour government to achieve a fraction of this, and under-estimated the ability of the state and private capital to resist it. Leaving the bulk of economic power in the hands of private capital, Labour nonetheless expected them to meekly accept tax rises, more government oversight, a workers' share in the control of industry, the socialisation of profitable companies... there was no way they were allowing this to happen.

It was a utopian programme in the strict sense that no thought had been given to the range of social forces it would be necessary to assemble and mobilise in order that its goals could be achieved, and its accomplishments protected. It was simply assumed that an elected government could bring these changes about, and that once implemented the ruling class would have no alternative but to accept them. What Benn was attempting was a radicalised version of Labour's traditional mission to bridge the gap between nation and class - that is, to tie the improvement of working class living conditions to the improvement of international economic competitiveness. Even so, the ambition the programme is a tribute to the way in which successful struggles had fired up the radical imagination. The atmosphere was such that even the traditionalist, pragmatist, right-wing Labour leadership felt compelled to accept it, and millions of working class people put their faith in it.

***

The 1974-1979 Labour government produced a terrible disillusionment. This opened the way for the split in the post-war Labour electoral coalition that took place between 1979 and 1983. Why? A number of things. Firstly, Labour didn't deliver. It found itself compelled to impose spending cuts to win loans and stabilise the currency, and pay cuts to restore profitability, and thus competitiveness, to British capital. Senior civil servants, the Labour Right, and the IMF worked in different ways to block the most radical of Labour's proposed reforms. Treasury officials worked to frustrate the radical policies promised in the Alternative Economic Strategy. The CBI threatened an investment strike if Tony Benn got his way, and considered illegal measures to subvert the government. That proved unnecessary in the end. 'Industrial democracy' was dropped as a policy goal, and the ambitious public ownership programme produced only a few nationalisations mainly to prop up failing businesses. Far from the rich being squeezed, it was wages that were held down.

Secondly, the supposed means of delivering a new society became the means by which working people suffered - the social contract, for example, which restricted wage increases to 5% at a time when inflation soared far higher, sometimes as high as 20%. The real terms pay cuts were deeper than those Heath had achieved. It was the institutions of the labour movement, the TUC General Council in lock step with a Labour government, that imposed this austerity, and it was more effective for that. Similarly, the idea of workers having a share of control in industry was commuted into the goal of 'participation', which basically meant that union officials presided along with management over harsh productivity deals. The victimisation and sacking of the famous Communist Party activist at Longbridge, Derek 'Red Robbo' Robinson, was driven in part by a special branch campaign against him. However, his involvement alongside management in enforcing productivity deals made his isolation possible. As did his encouraging workers to cross picket lines when the union leadership decided not to back a strike. 'Participation', far from democratising industry, coopted the union convenors, stewards and leadership in a harsher and more exploitative work regime, at just the time that wages were falling.

Thirdly, Keynesianism - upon which the Labour Left staked its alternative economic strategy - experienced a profound crisis. In theory, there was a trade off between prices and employment. As long as unemployment remained at around 2.5%, or thereabouts, inflationary pressures would subside. Therefore, it was entirely possible to spend one's way out of a recession, creating jobs and stimulating investment. But the 1970s showed that you could have high inflation, and high unemployment together. That is, there would be a rise in inflation followed by an economic slump in which inflation would only dip slightly while unemployment soared. High energy prices and the ability of monopoly capital to jack up consumer prices were jointly responsible for this. James Callaghan explained, as he was made Prime Minister in 1976, that it was no longer possible for governments to spend their way out of recession. Each time they did so, they merely added inflation to the system, and increased the level of unemployment that would follow in any future slump. As chancellor, then, Denis Healey focused on counterinflationary policies, pioneering the monetarist doctrine that Thatcher would briefly take up as her mantra. The ensuing bust-up with the labour movement, which the union leadership did everything it could to avoid, became known as the 'winter of discontent'.

***

The period from 1975-77 was characterised by a lull in strike actions, with days lost in 1976 the lowest for a decade. This had been because of the cooperation of the trade union leadership. The imposition of stage IV of the social contract, which pegged pay rises at 5%, produced a flood of strike actions, with more days lost in 1979 than in any year since 1926 (though, to be clear, the general strike still dwarfed the 1979 struggles), and higher than during the miners' strike in 1984. But the high level of militancy didn't necessarily reflect strength. During the post-war period in which organised labour had been powerful, strikes had been brief because they won easily - hence strike days lost were relatively few. The high level of industrial conflict reflected an employers' offensive that, moreover, was winning - with the labour movement increasingly demoralised and fragmented.

In that year, Labour was a hopeless shambles of a government, easy meat for Thatcher's Conservatives. Having lost MPs in bye-elections and become a minority government by 1977, it had held onto power through parliamentary contrivances, including a pact with David Steel's Liberals. It had no solutions, no alternative, no hope, no way, no how. Given the failure of the main left alternative, much of the public moved to the right. Majorities supported drastically reducing trade union power, though that did not last. On an increased turnout, the Tories won with 44% of the vote.

Right-wing Labourites, who had supported Roy Jenkins in the 1976 leadership contest, were preparing a split that would end up joining with the Liberals. Their Campaign for a Labour Victory later joined with the Social Democratic Alliance, a group formed by academics and others to fight the Labour Left, and in 1981 became the SDP. The rightist split was grossly irresponsible. with damaging long-term effects on British politics, but it was not an act of malice. The problem was that the liberal wing of the Labour Party was, like the Liberal Party, committed to conserving the post-war compromise, while the Labour Left was unsuccessfully trying to transcend it. As the liberals saw it, the Labour Left's ability to mobilise the party's machinery was forcing the party to adopt wildly unrealistic policies that would never be implemented, thus leading to demoralisation and defeat. This was partially based on a paranoid over-estimation of the Labour Left's forces, which - notwithstanding the brief upsurge of Bennism as youth riots spread across British cities - was in retreat. But they also believed that the union link was preventing Labour from adopting realistic policies, and that the idea of having a class-based party was at best outmoded. Hence, their goal was to realign British politics with the balance of power held by a centrist, cross-class party.

However, they would have got nowhere had the post-war compromise not been in meltdown since the late 1960s, during which time the Liberal vote first started to recover as an alternative to the big two parties, and had the government upon which the Labour Left pinned its hopes not turned out so disastrously. The emergence of a large centrist vote in the early 1980s was the culmination of a long-term trend, but it was compounded by the bitterness with the Labour Party and disappointment with the failure of late 1970s militancy. It produced the catastrophic defeat of 1983, and marked a long term split in the post-war Labour coalition. The fact that almost a third of trade unionists backed the SDP-Liberal Alliance, and only 40% voted for Labour, confirmed the damage that the 1974-79 government had done to its base. In fact, many of the new trade unionists were 'white collar'. Though their working conditions were not fundamentally different from those of 'blue collar' workers, they emerged during the period in which Labour had been in government and imposed many of the policies which they themselves had been compelled to combat. Therefore they did not, unlike previous generations of unionised workers, automatically identify Labourism as their natural political expression.

***

As always, the Labour right used the defeats to argue for a conservative retrenchment. In this, they were backed by the 'Eurocommunist' faction of the Communist Party, including luminaries such as Eric Hobsbawm. The capture of the NEC by the right-wing in 1981 was followed by Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley taking the leadership for the Right in 1983, and thus began the process of crushing the Left, witch-hunting the Militants, and abandoning policies with a left-wing semblance. Just as the trade union leadership embraced a 'new realism' with respect to industrial relations, emphasising cooperation with the Thatcher government, so Labour embraced a 'new realism' with respect to its key policies. Ron Todd, head of the TGWU, was cited by Kinnock in support of his right-wing stance: "What do you say to a docker who earns £400 a week, owns his own house, a new car, a microwave and a video, as well as a small place near Marbella? You do not say - let me take you out of your misery, brother."

It was a complete fabrication. No docker earned that much per week. But it perfectly encapsulated the narrative of 'popular capitalism', developed by the Thatcherites in the 1970s and repeated ad nauseum by the mass media in the 1980s. People owned shares now, or wanted to. They owned property, or aspired to. Rather than advocate public ownership of industries, it was better to support public private partnerships or share options for employees, as the Liberal-SDPers advocated. Workers, they said, were accustomed to high living standards, and thus less given to solidaristic politics. They were doing well, or confident about doing well - even in an era of mass unemployment, growing poverty, and the re-emergence of homelessness. The forward march of labour was not only halted, but in reverse, because the comforts of capitalist society had led to an embourgeoisement of the proletariat, such that they aspired not to socialism, but to greater capitalist success. Labour had no choice, according to Kinnock, Hattersley, Hobsbawm, and the right-wing union leaders, but to adapt to this emerging situation and craft policies to appeal to the aspirations of those workers.

The sociologist Huw Beynon has written of how pro-government advertising campaigns in the 1980s, often by public bodies, sought to convey the impression that Britain was becoming a classless nation of consumers. These campaigns appropriated the reassembled iconography of the Left, and working class counter-culture, using images of miners or Karl Marx, to communicate the new 'popular capitalism'. At the same time, the government changed its gathering of data, so that the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys announced in 1987 that it was no longer going to collect data on classes - a decision that was later revoked. (New Labour came up with a more subtle initiative in 1998, simply changing the definition of class so that the great majority would fit into the category, 'middle class'). In short, these myths were self-consciously created to obscure the deep unpopularity of Thatcherite policies, and the surprising resilience of core left-wing ideas.

***

Contrary to the myth of popular capitalism, only 4% of workers owned shares in 1987, and only 13% of the population as a whole. Today, individual share ownership accounts for 10% of total share values, with most accounted for by overseas owners in the US and EU, and institutional investors such as banks and financial institutions. The Department of Work and Pensions maintained in 2005 that 20% of households owned some shares but, as the UK Shareholders Association pointed out to its members, "the vast majority hold only a few shares".

Home ownership is one thing that did spread a little with 'right to buy', but it was not much more widespread in 1990 than it had been in 1980, and home ownership had been rising at a steady rate since the 1950s. What Thatcher did was not to radically increase the number of homes owned, but to ration housing, so that prices continually rose and so that the housing market could become a speculative entity enabling owners to borrow against the soaring value of their property to sustain consumption. But even this did not fundamentally affect people's voting habits.

The British Social Attitudes Survey of 1987 found that attitudes on the conflict between workers and management, on class conflict, on welfare, price controls, job creation, import controls, defence spending and a whole array of topics, remained basically social democratic, and this was especially among working class voters. Rather than evincing enthusiasm for a party of 'popular capitalism', most people thought the Tories represented only one class, and this was reflected in the fact that most did not vote for Thatcher. Majorities continued to self-identify as working class, and continued to believe that, as the social attitudes survey question has it, "there is a class war going on in this country". As Gordon Brown acknowledged at the time, Thatcherism never made much of an impact on British public opinion.

The myth of popular capitalism was allowed to take hold largely because the Labour Party itself abandoned the politics of redistribution and public ownership, and embraced Thatcherism. Public attitudes on class, inequality and welfare didn't fundamentally change in response to 18 years of Tory rule - in fact, the evidence is that they moved to the left somewhat. However, the Labour Party has a decisive ability to shape popular attitudes because of its relationship to working class voters, the trade union movement, and its hegemony over most forces left-of-centre. New Labour shifted public opinion to the right on, eg, redistribution, welfare and race, far more successfully than the Tories did. Even so, it was unable to shift opinion to the right on everything. For example, its privatization agenda was never popular, and 67% of people favour renationalising all public utilities privatised in the last 25 years. The point, though, is that the politics of abandoning and de-emphasising class, prevalent among the centre-left in the New Labour era, has been built on myths prepared by the Right. It was supposed to enable the renewal of social democracy with the possibility of an electoral coalition between Labour and the Liberal Democrats - such was the aim of Labour's right-wing 'modernisers'. But far from consolidating a progressive twenty-first century coalition, it has led to the profound degeneration of social democracy, the entrenchment of reactionary social policies to cope with the fall out from rising inequality, crackdowns on civil liberties to contain protest movements, and ultimately the emergence of a shabby ConDem coalition that could - if the Orange Liberals have their way - realign British politics further to the right. Reinstating class as a central heuristic and organising principle for the left is vital.

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Monday, June 21, 2010

The left and the state posted by Richard Seymour

The biggest task of the Left in the coming period will be stop an attack on welfare and public services from being conducted in the name of some sort of spurious "Big Society" (counterposed in Cameron's campaign literature to the evils of "Big Government"). Yet for those wishing to come to terms with New Labour's dismal record on civil liberties, and with the reactionary 'populism' of Ed Balls et al, there's a real problem in that the ConDem government have been able to position themselves slightly to the Blairites' left on such issues. Does New Labour's obscene authoritarianism reflect poorly on the Left's attitude to the state? Frances Klug at Open Democracy thinks it does. Sunny Hundal at Pickled Politics rightly objects to the conflation of the Left with New Labour, but nonetheless asserts that there is a problem here, which he credits Anthony Barnett with raising.

The question of the left's relationship to the state is far more complex than one might gather here. For example, the Left has long championed - to varying degrees, admittedly - liberal anti-statist positions with respect to gender rights, crime, immigration, sexuality, political protest, religion, recreational drugs, etc. Notably, the Left made far more advances in these terrains in the 20th Century than outright liberals - though liberals within the Labour Party such as Roy Jenkins certainly deserve credit in this regard. In fact, though Frances Klug charges that the problem is the left's illiberality, counterposing to such left-wing statism a tradition of liberal egalitarianism deriving from the 18th Century Enlightenment, it is at least worth noting in passing that liberalism has a far more ambiguous relationship to the state and authority than this picture allows. After all, for all that Thomas Paine was an admirable chap, the mainstream of British liberalism is and always has been Hobbesian in its foundations - consequently, all to often authoritarian, imperialist, racist, and decidedly inegalitarian.

More importantly, this debate on the Left has a venerable pedigree. Barnett's critique of the imperial state emerges from his time in the New Left which - prompted by some of the limitations of Labourism in office - sought to understand why achieving radical reforms, even where they had demonstrable support, was so difficult. Their attention turned inevitably to the nature of the state that Labour had attempted to use to deliver said reforms. This produced a variety of critical analyses of the state, of the post-war compromise, and of the corporatist managerialism that has become synonymous with social democracy.

In response to the failings of corporatism, Labour left-wingers such as Tony Benn and Michael Barratt Brown began to subject the old forms of undemocratic statism, which they ultimately blamed for repressing workers' wage claims, holding down living standards, and serving the interests of capital. Others such as Brian Sedgemore encountered serious difficulties with the alleged 'neutrality' of the civil service, whom they accused of obstructing radical reforms. In this period, much of the Labour Left began to re-articulate a critique first outlined by Harold Laski, who maintained that the British constitution was so vague that it allowed serious abuses and repression, up to and including the effective suppression of parliamentary democracy, with no breach of the law taking place. Given the social relations in which the state was embedded, he argued, such repression would usually work to the benefit of capital. Any reforming government would have to work fast to outflank the inevitable attack on the government's legitimacy from the right, prevent the possibility of capital flight and an attack on the currency, resist media pressure, etc. They might have to pass emergency legislation permitting them to act hastily, outwith the usual domesticating, procrastinating procedures. In the long term, they would also have to challenge the undemocratic nature of the state itself. But here, constitutionalism prevailed. The Labour Left, from Laski to Benn, was never revolutionary: ultimately, there was nothing wrong with the state that could not be fixed by what was right with the state.

Perry Anderson, Tom Nairn and Ralph Miliband provided different responses to this question. For Anderson and Nairn, the British state was a unique amalgamation of modern capitalist bureaucracy, and ancient feudal privilege. This was a result of a compromise between the aristocracy and the "supine bourgeoisie" in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. This resulted in bizarre anti-democratic contraptions such as royal prerogative, the crown-in-parliament, . It was also connected to the special influence enjoyed by the City of London. Put crudely, Anderson's thesis consisted of the following assertions: Britain had the first, but most mediated and least pure "bourgeois revolution" of any major European country; England had the first industrial revolution, and created a proletariat before the emergence of mature socialist theory, and the polarisation of industrial bourgeoisie and aristocracy was attenuated by the fear of this class, particularly in the wake of the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars; Britain had, by the end of the 19th Century, siezed the largest Empire in history, qualitatively distinct from other European powers, "which saturated and 'set' British society in a mould that it has retained to this day, with the consequence that most major figures of the British Left were vocal imperialists; among European nations, England alone emerged from the two world wars, unoccupied and without major exogenous shock or discontinuity to its social structure. This peculiar nature of the British state - a semi-feudal, imperialist state - held back the labour movement's progress, and stymied even moderate forms of social democracy, such that Britain's left performed poorly compared to continental counterparts.

Miliband's critique was more ecumenical - the problem with the state was not that it had feudal remnants, which were ultimately of secondary importance. The British state was not markedly different from other capitalist states in how it functioned. But its major institutions, from the civil service to the judiciary, saw their role as reproducing the society as it existed, and were resistant to reforms. Its elite personnel were interpenetrated with elite layers in private industry - the way in which nationalised industries were run by a combination of private capitalists and senior civil servants working with administrative models derived from their experience of ruling India, was a case in point. The state could be reformed in more democratic ways, and could be compelled to redistribute wealth and power, but the animus for the reform had to arise from constituencies outside the state - civil society. Notably, Klug acknowledges Miliband's critique but, oddly, not the fact that it draws on the a priori anti-statism of one Karl Marx whom she unfairly traduces as the source of left-wing statism, including that of opponents such as the Fabians - apre Marx, l'etat. This is crude. Has anyone, for example, read Marx on the Paris Commune?

At any rate, such is the New Left intellectual lineage that people like Barnett have drawn from - or rather, it's a potted history of the same. The milieu around Charter 88, of which Barnett was a founding member, were immersed in this stuff, and its demand for profound constitutional reforms were taken up by relatively moderate social democratic commentators such as Will Hutton. This debate, I repeat, is not new. If most on the Left differ with the diagnosis of Barnett and the Open Democracy liberals, it is not because their egalitarian commitments lead them to underestimate the problems with the state. It is because they disagree on the nature of the problem, and on the importance of the role played by such institutions as the monarchy, the Lords, the electoral system, etc.

The authoritarian tendencies in New Labour do not, I think, emerge from the left's ambivalent relationship to the state viz. redistribution and nationalisation. After all, Labour has previously been able to deliver decent liberal reforms *and* social democratic corporatism. Indeed, for as long as it was able to moderately redistribute wealth and maintain a decent welfare state, it was easier for Labour to pass what were sometimes unpopular pieces of liberal legislation. The source of New Labour's authoritarianism is, I think, two-fold.

Firstly, as Ross McKibbin argues in the London Review of Books, Labour has a Tory conception of the state - it accepts feudal privileges (the monarchy, the royal prerogative, etc); it accepts an undemocratic intelligence service; it accepts nuclear weapons; and it has always accepted the imperialist capacity of the state, from the Boers to Basra as it were. Secondly, it has accepted neoliberal dogma and the doctrine of meritocracy, which holds that the poor are in their position because of their own inadequacies, or because of the inadequacies of their parents. They are crime-prone, anti-social, feckless, and lazy. Hence, to combat social exclusion and create a more egalitarian society, it is necessary to control the poor with tougher sentencing, ASBOS, fines for parents of truant kids, witch-hunting "benefit scroungers", surveilling and intervening in potential problem families as soon as the child is born. In that way, the poor will become more productive, more responsible, more educated, and more skilled. From a supply-side perspective, this will reduce the "non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment" (a doctrine that formed the basis of Brown's economic policy), thus reducing the margin of the 'socially excluded', the 20% of households with no one in employent and thus with no access to the ladder of meritocratic competition. Ironically, it is neoliberalism - which is held to be in some sense an anti-statist doctrine - that is responsible for New Labour's hardline statism.

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Friday, February 12, 2010

Gordon Brown had better call an election soon posted by Richard Seymour

Brown hasn't had a very easy time since moving into Number 10. It took a few months at most for the 'Iron Chancellor' to become a marshmallow Prime Minister. Tory leads have sometimes been in double figures, especially during the period since the credit crunch. There has, however, been a slight rebound in Labour's fortunes since it was announced that Britain was officially, but only slightly, out of recession. This is consistent through all the polls, and it would seem to be in part because of the unpopularity of the Conservatives' plans for cutbacks. Cameron was forced to make a rhetorical retreat on that issue when he protested that he wasn't planning 'swingeing' cuts. The swing may continue to favour Labour for a while, and though it is unlikely to be sufficient stop the Tories getting a plurality, it might be enough to result in a hung parliament. And I wouldn't hold out for better than that if I were the PM, which I obviously should be. Greece has been denied its bail-out, apparently on the initiative of Angela Merkel. That may have something to do with the fact that Germany's recovery has just come to an abrupt stop. The Eurozone has experienced almost zero growth, and the Euro is plummeting again. The EU is desperately trying to stop the currency from collapsing. Previously, the countries suffering from high deficits would have tried to stimulate demand for their products by devaluing the currency. This would have made imports more expensive, and exports less expensive. It would have helped bring the current account deficit under control. Now that they're in the Eurozone, they lack the mechanism to do so.

Now, the fact is that even right-wing commentators are astounded at the austerity measures being imposed on Greece, without any hint of support. It's not just the Krugmans and the Stiglitzs who are appalled. Martin Wolf of the FT, ordinarily a reliably conservative opinionator, advised that it would be insanity to force Greece to accept austerity measures, and urged European governments to bail out Greece and stimulate demand across the continent. Even Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the reactionary business and economics columnist for the Daily Telegraph, was scathing on the topic. Their case is simple, and persuasive: Greece and other southern European economies experienced private sector booms as a result of deceptively low interest rates in the Eurozone. Hence, consumers could borrow and spend way more than they had earned in income. The credit crunch threatened those economies with catastrophe unless governments intervened to sustain demand. But that has now led to huge deficits coupled with sky-high debt. To force them to cut state expenditures at this point would be to invite the same catastrophe that loomed when the credit crunch began - a devastating slump in demand, soaring unemployment rates, a possible default on loans, with a predictable continent-wide impact. Only a bail-out, with low interest loans extended to Greece and other countries in the same situation could help

The signs are that the Eurozone is in deep trouble, and the British economy is unlikely to be exempted from this process. The UK has a high debt to GDP ratio, Niall Ferguson, presently enjoying a concupiscence with the Dutch-Somali neoconservative Ayaan Hirsi Ali, goes further and opines that the debt crisis will befall America next, because of the high deficits run up to sustain demand. You don't have to accept his 'free market' perspective to understand that there's a real problem here. If the deficits remain high and investors "lose confidence" in the ability of European governments to repay their loans, then the interest rates soar, and governments end up spending a sizeable portion of new wealth produced on servicing the debt. Greece is already paying about 5% of its GDP per annum on interest charges. That means that productive wealth is being sucked out of the economy and poured into the coffers of bond and gilt traders, and over the medium term it threatens any recovery that might emerge. To pay off the debts with fiscal austerity, though, is also to threaten recovery. To the extent that these trends are replicated elsewhere, then they pose the same dilemmas. Of course, national governments outside the Eurozone can theoretically devalue their currency in the hope of making exports cheaper and imports more expensive, thus hopefully stimulating their economies and building up the tax base to balance the budget. But the UK would find it difficult to do this, since that would hurt the City, and it would drive up yields on government bonds. The manufacturing sector is fucked anyway, short of a national public works campaign. And America would like to do it, but it is now having to compete with China over currency devaluations, and China is winning.

Now consider that the small Brown bounce in the polls follows a GDP increase of just 0.1%. Consider all the tax cuts, the interest rate cuts, the quantitative easing, the brought forward public spending, the bank bailouts. This has been a hugely costly rescue plan, and the government has made it clear that it will be paid for mainly by the working class, and especially by public sector workers (notwithstanding small tax increases for the very well off). If the economy goes under now, then the government's last chance is blown. It doesn't matter that the Tories are worse, and that their strategy would hurt workers' living standards quite considerably. The anger will just overwhelm the government. So, if New Labour's line is going to be "our strategy has worked and the Tories' cuts will ruin it", then they need to cash in on it before the crisis resumes with force.

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