Threshold of the Bolivarian revolution posted by Richard Seymour

Guest post by Callum McCormick:


There is a consensus that the Venezuelan Presidential elections set for October this year will pose the most serious electoral challenge yet to Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolution. The Venezuelan opposition, which for much of the Chavez era has busied itself with reactionary intrigue, self-defeating abstentions, various forms of economic sabotage and fratricidal conflict, has selected itself a plausible candidate, Henrique Caprilles, the ‘youthful’ governor of Miranda state and signalled its intention to mount a genuine campaign. While the odds are still in Chavez’s favour, the polls suggest a tight election is in the offing and a defeat for Chavez is not beyond the realms of possibility. The price of Venezuelan bonds and those of the state owned oil company (PDVSA) rallied recently, with the suggestion being that international financiers are gearing up for Chavez’s downfall and the economic ‘reform’ that might follow.

The upcoming race comes after some setbacks for the regime, including the loss of the PDVSA’s ‘supermajority’ in the Venezuelan legislature in the 2010 elections, itself preceded by reversals in the 2008 local elections that included the loss of the important and symbolic mayoralty of Caracas, and, of course, the President’s battle with cancer. (There is currently a rather bizarre debate going on in the Venezuelan media about when and where it is appropriate to use the word ‘metastasize’). While Caprilles is sticking to the line that he hopes the President recovers, the opposition press is filled daily with various unsubstantiated rumours about the true state of Chavez’s health. For its part, the government does not seem to have helped matters by pursuing a somewhat defensive and secretive attitude to the matter. Along with doubts about whether Chavez will be able to complete another 6-year term should he win, the issues that look set to form the bulk of the opposition’s campaign include inflation (which is high but falling, and is positively mild compared with examples from Latin American history), shortages in food and , above all, law and order.

Crime in Venezuela, by any measure, is a problem. The murder rate in the country is something like ten times the global average and Caracas in particular is a violent place. The murder rate in the capital city of 163 per  100,000 compares with 2 per 100,000 in London, or to give a more reasonable comparison, around 5 per 100,000 in Buenos Aires. Of course the figures, like everything in Venezuela, are highly contested and subject to immediate politicization by Chavez’s opponents. The travel advice issued to American tourists by the State Department makes Caracas sound like Mogadishu. Federico Welsch, a professor of political science at a Caracas university blamed the ‘government discourse’ for the violence because it teaches the young that ‘if you are lacking something, it is because of injustice. Then look for it, take it away from those who have it. You can obtain justice in your own hands’. The relationship between socialism and armed robbery, sadly broken since the halcyon days of 1970’s urban guerrillas, has perhaps been re-established.

Of course, the crime levels in Caracas and the country generally do not exactly present an impenetrable mystery. The cities layout functions as a metaphor for inequality in Latin America as a whole, as well as an object lesson in urban planning gone awry. The poor, working mostly in the growing ‘informal sector’, are crowded into hillside barrios that surround and stalk the affluent neighbourhoods below. Abject poverty exists alongside well-guarded shopping malls that stock all the latest consumer goods and house plush fine-dining restaurants. Income inequality over the period of Chavez’s rule has fallen and the poorest have seen their income rise quickest, but the sources of real structural inequality have remained largely unchallenged.  One of the programs the government has recently introduced is a new house-building program designed to provide good housing to replace the desperate slums described, for instance, in Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums.  

In any case, the fear of ‘lawlessness’ that is growing particularly among the middle and upper classes (the bulk of the violence is actually poor on poor and occurs within the barrios) is being stoked by the media and feeds into a more general sense of social ‘unease’ that Chavez has provoked among those at the top of Venezuelan society.

This line of attack is itself somewhat novel, since most previous opposition campaigns have amounted to hysterical denunciations of the ‘tyranny’ of Chavismo, thinly veiled racist vilification of Chavez and his supporters and paranoid fantasies about the role of Cuba in the country. The latter was re-animated this week when the opposition accused Chavez of ‘violating the constitution’ by ‘issuing decrees’ from Havana, where he was receiving treatment for his tumour.

On the whole though, the opposition has been pursuing a new track over the last few years in particular. Apparently finally disabused of the notion that they, and those they represent, have a divine right to govern the country and that Chavismo amounts to a savage anomaly, they are pursuing a new ‘inclusive’ strategy. This strategy, based on the assumption that a third of Venezuelans will always vote for Chavez and another third against, is intended to ‘depolarize’ the debate and convince ‘independents’ that the opposition are once again fit to rule. Caprilles has made much of his admiration for the social liberal model pursued over the last decade by Brazil in an attempt to neutralize the accusation that the opposition simply wants a return to the old neo-liberal order.

For those who support Chavez and the project of ‘21st century socialism’, the election is something of a crossroads. The long time activist and former member of the Chavez government, Roland Denis, recently said that the project for building an alternative to capitalism had ‘collapsed’. The problem for Chavez is the same one confronting all the governments of the ‘pink tide’ in Latin America. Their elections expressed and promoted a desire for radical social change among the despised masses of Latin America. Their actions in government have often given concrete form to these desires and just as often thwarted them.

The story is an old one. Propelled into government across the continent as part of a deep and general revolt against the IMF imposed ‘structural adjustment’ programs of the 80’s and 90’s, the ‘new left’ is faced with the dilemma of knowing that an alternative is needed but not quite being sure what it is. Socialism is, not the first time, proclaimed everywhere and created nowhere.

In many senses, the crisis of the Morales regime in Bolivia is even more acute. His approval ratings are hitting the floor amidst a series of social revolts whose participants would have been seen as his natural allies. Jeffrey Webber has written elsewhere about the struggle over TIPNIS and the planned road through indigenous land that was recently ‘delayed’. The regime was recently embroiled in an even uglier dispute when the police attacked a protest of ‘las personas con discapacidades’ (the disabled) who were threatening self-immolation and hunger strike in their campaign to win an annual grant from the government.

While a defeat would for Chavez would be a setback for the left and perhaps ignite a ‘carnival of reaction’ across the continent, the more fundamental questions would be perhaps be posed by a Chavez victory. If he were to win and serve a full term, he would have spent 20 years as Venezuelan President, much of that time with big legislative majorities and with the benefit of historically high oil prices (something like 80% of Venezuelan export revenue comes from oil). There is little doubt that Venezuelan society will have made progress in that period, but enough progress to justify the uncritical praise heaped on Chavez by sections of the Left?

Some were perhaps given a moment’s pause by Chavez’s fairly disgraceful attitude to events in Libya, where he parroted various infamies against the Libyan rebels and defended Gaddafi to the hilt. He seems intent on pursuing the same course in the Syrian case, recently providing the regime with a shipment of oil. While consistent anti-imperialism is to be applauded, Chavez seems incapable of reconciling this commitment with recognition of the legitimate desire for an end to authoritarianism that is causing the convulsions in the Middle East and North Africa.
Hugo Chavez has been and remains a figurehead and an inspiration for anti-imperialists and anti-capitalists across Latin America and the world. Should he head off the latest challenge to his government from a Venezuelan opposition for which no one on the Left should feel the slightest sympathy, then it is incumbent upon those who favour socialist change in Venezuela and beyond to build up the pressure for a fundamental and irreversible transformation of Venezuelan society. While Chavez and his government have the opportunity to play a role in that transformation, its ultimate success lies in forces beyond him and his regime, in the poor and working class of Venezuela. Only their self-activity and self-emancipation can provide the change Venezuela needs.

Labels: 21st century socialism, chavez, left, socialism, venezuela, working class

"Inside the Revolution" posted by Richard Seymour

Labels: bolivarian revolution, chavez, inside the revolution, socialism, US imperialism, venezuela

That Honduras coup posted by Richard Seymour

In the past, if a Central American military deposed a left-wing government, Bush would have declared that he was happy to see democracy prevail. These days, the State Department bristles that it is shocked - shocked - by the affront to a sovereign country's constitution. One way to determine whether the US ruling class actually approves of the coup, though, is to consult its media. Here's one index of the corporate media's view of the coup:

Did a CID-Gallup poll last week indicate that a plurality of Hondurans support the military coup against democratically elected President Zelaya? Yes, according to the Washington Post [July 9], the Wall Street Journal [July 10], the Christian Science Monitor [July 11], and Reuters [July 9], which all reported that the poll showed 41% in favor of the coup, with only 28% opposed.

But in fact the poll showed that 46% -- a plurality -- were *opposed* to the coup, according to the New York Times [July 10], the Associated Press [July 11] and the president of CID-Gallup, in an interview with Voice of America on July 9.

As of this writing -- Sunday evening, 5:30 pm Eastern time -- none of the outlets which reported the poll incorrectly had corrected their earlier, inaccurate, reports.

Another way to study this is to determine whether the US government actually approved of the coup, despite its disavowals. Eva Golinger has some thoughts:

• The Department of State had prior knowledge of the coup.

• The Department of State and the US Congress funded and advised the actors and organizations in Honduras that participated in the coup.

• The Pentagon trained, schooled, commanded, funded and armed the Honduran armed forces that perpetrated the coup and that continue to repress the people of Honduras by force.

• The US military presence in Honduras, that occupies the Soto Cano (Palmerola) military base, authorized the coup d’etat through its tacit complicity and refusal to withdraw its support of the Honduran military involved in the coup.

• The US Ambassador in Tegucigalpa, Hugo Llorens, coordinated the removal from power of President Manuel Zelaya, together with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon y John Negroponte, who presently works as an advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

• From the first day the coup occurred, Washington has referred to “both parties” involved and the necessity for “dialogue” to restore constitutional order, legitimizing the coup leaders by regarding them as equal players instead of criminal violators of human rights and democratic principles.

• The Department of State has refused to legally classify the events in Honduras as a “coup d’etat”, nor has it suspended or frozen its economic aid or commerce to Honduras, and has taken no measures to effectively pressure the de facto regime.

• Washington manipulated the Organization of American States (OAS) in order to buy time, therefore allowing the coup regime to consolidate and weaken the possibility of President Zelaya’s immediate return to power, as part of a strategy still in place that simply seeks to legitimate the de facto regime and wear down the Honduran people that still resist the coup.

• Secretary of State Clinton and her spokesmen stopped speaking of President Zelaya’s return to power after they designated Costa Rican president Oscar Arias as the “mediator” between the coup regime and the constitutional government; and now the State Department refers to the dictator that illegally took power during the coup, Roberto Micheletti, as the “interim caretaker president”.

• The strategy of “negotiating” with the coup regime was imposed by the Obama administration as a way of discrediting President Zelaya – blaming him for provoking the coup – and legitimizing the coup leaders.

• Members of the US Congress – democrats and republicans – organized a visit of representatives from the coup regime in Honduras to Washington, receiving them with honors in different arenas in the US capital.

• Despite the fact that originally it was Republican Senator John McCain who coordinated the visit of the coup regime representatives to Washington through a lobby firm connected to his office, The Cormac Group, now, the illegal regime is being representated by top notch lobbyist and Clinton attorney Lanny Davis, who is using his pull and influence in Washington to achieve overall acceptance – cross party lines – of the coup regime in Honduras.

• Otto Reich and a Venezuelan named Robert Carmona-Borjas, known for his role as attorney for the dictator Pedro Carmona during the April 2002 coup d’etat in Venezuela, aided in preparing the groundwork for the coup against President Zelaya in Honduras.

• The team designated from Washigton to design and help prepare the coup in Honduras also included a group of US ambassadors recently named in Central America, experts in destabilizing efforts against the Cuban revolution, and Adolfo Franco, ex administrator for USAID’s Cuba “transition to democracy” program.

Labels: chavez, coup, honduras, latin america, US imperialism, zeyala

Coup d'etat in Honduras posted by Richard Seymour

So, is the six month old Obama administration taking ickle baby-steps towards its first coup? Eva Golinger thinks so. The background:

Supposedly at the center of the controversary is today's scheduled referendum, which is not a binding vote but merely an opinion poll to determine whether or not a majority of Hondurans desire to eventually enter into a process to modify their constitution.

Such an initiative has never taken place in the Central American nation, which has a very limited constitution that allows minimal participation by the people of Honduras in their political processes. The current constitution, written in 1982 during the height of the Reagan Administration's dirty war in Central America, was designed to ensure those in power, both economic and political, would retain it with little interference from the people.

Ah yes, the Reagan years, during which time Honduras was the base for CIA training of Nicaraguan death squads. This was also the era during which John Negroponte was helping flood the country with military aid so that Battalion 316 could murder and torture dissidents. Proceeding:

Zelaya, elected in November 2005 on the platform of Honduras' Liberal Party, had proposed the opinion poll be conducted to determine if a majority of citizens agreed that constitutional reform was necessary. He was backed by a majority of labor unions and social movements in the country. If the poll had occured, depending on the results, a referendum would have been conducted during the upcoming elections in November to vote on convening a constitutional assembly. Nevertheless, today's scheduled poll was not binding by law. In fact, several days before the poll was to occur, Honduras' Supreme Court ruled it illegal, upon request by the Congress, both of which are led by anti-Zelaya majorities and members of the ultra-conservative party, National Party of Honduras (PNH).

Zelaya has been irritating the country's ruling class for some time with his support for Chavez and the 'Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas', and his calls for drug legalisation, but the attempt to maybe, pending a possible future referendum, democratise the system a little was a step too far. The Miami Herald, naturally enough, vocalised the propaganda of the would-be putschists a couple of days ago, namely their speculation that the aim might secretly be to try to remove the cap on presidential re-elections and thus have some sort of elected dictatorship just like that Chavez monster. So, to forestall the possibility, the military has installed an unelected dictatorship. The White House is denying any involvement in the coup. Is it a plausible denial? Back to Eve Gollinger:

Another major source of funding in Honduras is USAID, providing over US$ 50 millon annually for "democracy promotion" programs, which generally supports NGOs and political parties favorable to U.S. interests, as has been the case in Venezuela, Bolivia and other nations in the region. The Pentagon also maintains a military base in Honduras in Soto Cano, equipped with approximately 500 troops and numerous air force combat planes and helicopters. Foreign Minister Rodas has stated that she has repeatedly tried to make contact with the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras, Hugo Llorens, who has not responded to any of her calls thus far. The modus operandi of the coup makes clear that Washington is involved. Neither the Honduran military, which is majority trained by U.S. forces, nor the political and economic elite, would act to oust a democratically elected president without the backing and support of the U.S. government.

Well. I would say that if the behemoth just to the north has a military base in your country, and funds your military and major pro-US parties, then you probably do have to get their permission before overthrowing the government. The Honduran army will presumably now have a brief to deal with the protesters, the social movements, the labour organisations, and everyone else who has been inconvenient in backing Zelaya and might now try to resist the coup. They're calling it a 'bloodless' coup... for now.

Update: well, well.

Labels: chavez, coup, democracy, dictatorship, honduras, referendum, US imperialism, venezuela

Nasrallah: Arab leaders should learn from Chavez posted by Richard Seymour

"Yesterday, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced that he would expel the Israeli ambassador in Venezuela. He, of course, did this in order to show his support for the Palestinians. Venezuela is very close to America, it is a neighbor of America. This is Chavez. He did this because of his humanity, his sense of revolution, and, in this way, he dealt a severe blow to those who are now hosting the ambassadors of Israel in their capitals and do not have enough courage to even think about telling them to leave.

"Today, Arab leaders need to take lessons from this Latin American leader. They have to learn how to show support for the people of Palestine."

Labels: chavez, gaza, hamas, invasion, Israel, nasrallah, palestine, war crimes

A foreign policy for Obama posted by Richard Seymour

I know that all would-be potentates at all levels read my blog devotedly, if not religiously. Naturally, I ignore the noisome little grunts most of the time. But this is one occasion on which I shall have to disclose the secret to America's future foreign policy comportment for the most likely President-elect come November, BHO. I have to because, as is so often the case, this upstart doesn't even understand what is in America's interests (I would not expect any other concern to enter into the discussion). Here are three policies that Obama should pursue:

1) Stop trying to expand NATO. Shut it down if possible. It is a danger to the Euro-American Alliance - every expansion riles the Caucasian bear and draws in potentially volatile units. It introduces discord where American hegemony requires harmony. If even Silvio Berlusconi, the most pro-American political leader in Europe, sides with the Russkies, you have problems.

2) Make nice to Chavez. Venezuela may have a social revolution, or it may not. But at the moment, it is still open to US capital on revised terms, and you had better take those terms because Latin America is no longer just a plantation outback. And even the Bolsheviks were open to American business, so even social revolution need not be a disaster. Better kiss up to Raul Castro too - he has big oilfields now, and you know that your 'clean coal'/nuclear energy ruse isn't going to last a day once you're elected.

3) Withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. The US has already admitted it can't hold Iraq without the acquiescence of significant (in both senses) layers of the population. That is why the occupation forces had to cut deals with the Sunni resistance fighters and then the Mahdi Army. And it's still no better than it was in 2004/5. That was hardly a sterling moment as I recall. So give up trying to impose a humiliating Status of Forces Agreement, and negotiate an expeditious withdrawal. Secondly, talk tough on Afghanistan and Pakistan if you must, but you and Brzezinski know that you can't afford to have Central Asia go up in flames. And there is sufficient economic and social 'dislocation' there to bring about a mass revolt should you try to expand the war into Pakistan, as the prevailing imperial logic dictates. You can weather the shrill chorus of 'surrender', especially if - as is anticipated - the Senate enters 'filibuster-proof' territory. Just cut a deal with the current vicious warlords and the Taliban, tell Dyncorps where to get off, and allow the Afghan people to regroup and resist on their own terms, without American bombs falling all around them.

Obama can listen to the silver-haired bagpipe that he has chosen for a VP if he likes, but I'm trying to help the guy. Be a wise imperialist, I warn him, or we - the royal we, the editorial we, and the collective we - will be obliged to do something unconscionable.

Labels: afghanistan, barack obama, chavez, foreign policy, Georgia, iraq, iraqi resistance, NATO, russia, US imperialism

Chavez's retreat. posted by Richard Seymour

A while ago, Chavez announced a cabinet reshuffle, with the explanation that he was taking the radical edge off his government. The occasion for this is obviously his defeat by 1.3% of the vote in the recent referendum. The problematic nature of some of the policies, the fact that they were presented on a take it or leave it basis, and the haste with which they were taken to the polls, left many of Chavez's erstwhile supporters alienated. 3 million of his voters stayed home. Gregory Wilpert, the author of the excellent Changing Venezuela By Taking Power, has assessed the problems that dogged the reform attempt:

There appear to be four main reasons why the reform initiative failed: the way the campaign was conducted, the defection of long-time supporters, the mood in the country and the process through which the reform was developed. At first this process took place entirely within a closed circle of Chávez advisors. Then, when the National Assembly debated the proposal, legislators held public meetings to get outside input, but the process was rushed, covering 69 articles in two and a half months, so the discussion was superficial.

Opposition literature was characteristically packed with hyperbole and distortion, and the right-wing cried that dictatorship was afoot. Chavez tried to use his popularity to sell the proposals, but hitherto allies criticised the measures and many supporters were angered by the ineffectual way in which the previous reforms - welcomed as a rule - were delivered. Wilpert hoped that Chavez would find fault in the top-down process through which "socialism in the 21st Century" was being elaborated". Sadly, it looks as if Chavez has drawn the conclusion that the referendum defeat was a defeat for socialism in the immediate term, and therefore he will concentrate on winning over middle class Venezuelans and the national bourgeoisie. Stephanie Blankenburg, writing in The New Statesman, points out that this conclusion is probably not merited. The opposition did not gain votes, but Chavez lost them. One of the main reasons, she suggests, is the pressure exerted on the Chavistas by the state in which they are operating, which has conservatizing and corrupting tendencies. Many of the Chavistas, Blankenburg argues, are now effective opponents of a radical socialist agenda, and have used their position to block reform even where they publicly favour it. The effective boycott by 3 million voters may have been a protest by the "Chavista street" against the "Chavista elite". And the trouble, if this is true, is that Chavez may further alienate his popular base, and boost the confidence of the opposition, for whom Chavez's greatest protection is the willingness of millions of Venezuelans to mobilise in his defense. He was far wiser when he decided in 2002 that moderation and making nice to the opposition only emboldens them further.

Labels: chavez, socialism, venezuela

"¡Más Chavista que nunca!" (More Chavista than ever!) posted by Richard Seymour

Guest post by elpresidente

There follows a list of quotes translated from the original Spanish from Venezuelan politicians and activists discussing the recent referendum.

In 2006, President Chávez won the presidential elections with 62 per cent of the vote, obtaining the support of 7,309,000 people. A year later, the president’s Constitutional Reform only received 4,380,000 votes in favour, which allows the simple observation that some 3 million people who voted for President Chávez in 2006 decided not to vote for his Constitutional Reform proposal.

In contrast, in 2006, Chávez’s closest competitor, the opposition candidate Manuel Rosales, obtained 4,292,000 votes. In 2007, those who were opposed to the reform numbered 4,504,000 - two hundred thousand more people than had voted for the opposition in 2006.

En 2006, el Presidente Chávez ganó las elecciones presidenciales con un 62 por ciento de los votos, obteniendo el apoyo de 7.309.000 personas. Un año después, la Reforma Constitucional del Presidente Chávez sólo logró 4.380.000 votos a favor, lo que a simple vista denota que unas 3 millones de personas que habían votado por el Presidente Chávez en 2006 decidieron no votar por su propuesta de Reforma Constitucional.

En contraste, en 2006 el más cercano competidor de Chávez, el opositor Manuel Rosales, obtuvo 4.292.000 votos. En 2007, quienes se opusieron a su propuesta de Reforma fueron 4.504.000 personas, doscientas mil personas más que quienes votaron por la oposición en 2006.


What is to be done? To leave this situation and ensure that the revolutionary process overcomes this moment and can deepen, it is essential that all power should pass to the people and their organisations.

The Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) congress should become a more democratic organisation where all could think, propose, criticise and decide the best course for the Bolivarian revolution, without the restrictions or bureaucratic interference that prevents free discussion.

We have immense confidence that hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans will continue advancing the socialist project, and will confront on this road any attacks the right may try to make. But this confidence must be accompanied by unity and organisation, and the construction of a space to debate all these themes.

¿Qué se va hacer? Para salir de esta situación y que el proceso revolucionario supere este momento y pueda profundizarse, verdaderamente todo el poder debe pasar al pueblo y a sus organizaciones.

El Congreso del Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) debe transformarse en la más democrática instancia donde todos podamos opinar, proponer, criticar y decidir lo mejor para la revolución bolivariana, sin restricciones y sin injerencias burocráticas que impidan una libre discusión.

Tenemos inmensa confianza en que cientos de miles de compatriotas podemos seguir con el proyecto socialista y enfrentar en ese camino cualquier intento que la derecha pretenda realizar. Pero a la confianza hay que acompañarla de unidad y de organización, construyendo un espacio común para debatir todos estos temas.

Stalin Pérez, Vilma Vivas, Marco García e Ismael Hernández, Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT) sindicalistas, Caracas

For so long the President has been favouring people with scarce resources and proposing actions to continue helping the poorest such as through the Consejos Comunales, and I believe that the abstention was a result of complacency, a lack of political maturity, and ingratitude, but the real problem is the situation of criminality and gangsterism in the barrios.

(The campaign) failed to organize regular political debates to explain and compare the advantages and disadvantages between socialism and capitalism. Some just wanted to take from the revolution, and for these, it doesn’t matter whether they vote or not. As such, those who abstained have to accept their irresponsibility.

A estas alturas del tiempo que lleva el Presidente favoreciendo a la gente de menores recursos y proponiendo acciones para seguir ayudandolos como es el caso de los Consejos Comunales, creo que la abstención obedece a la comodidad, falta de madurez política e ingratitud de la gente, pero un problema real es la situación en los barrios con visos de criminalidad y pandillerismo.

Falta realizar, como rutina, talleres de ideología que explique y confronte ventajas y desventajas entre socialismo y capitalismo. Algunos sólo quieren vivir de la revolución y por ello les da lo mismo votar o no. Así que los abstencionistas asuman su irresponsabilidad.

Dalia Pérez, Barquisimeto


I hope the President counter attacks… it seems to me that the politicians were overconfident in the campaign, but now we should advance on the attack.

Aspiro que el presidente haga lo que más el contraataque… ahí se crece… me parece que en la campaña hubo exceso de confianza de parte del políticos, pero ahora debemos avanzar al ataque.

José Rojas, Barrio El Junquito, Caracas

We have to find out what happened with this Chavismo Lite that stayed at home, we have to see what is going on with the people.

Furthermore, we have to make sure that its not just politicians in the media influencing this mystical public opinion, but that all Venezuelans are involved in politics.

We have to organize ourselves, go into the streets, construct this community, these consejos… we have to respect our President and bring the confused abstainers to the polls.

The fight continues comrades - this hasn’t finished, and he who doesn’t believe that doesn’t deserve to be called a revolutionary.

Tenemos que ver que pasa con ese Chavismo Light que se quedo en su casa, tenemos que ver que esta pasando en el pueblo.

Además tenemos que demostrar que no es político solo el que habla en medios y crea esa mitificada opinión publica, sino todos y todas las venezolanas y venezolanos, todos tenemos que estar inmiscuidos en problemas políticos.

Tenemos que organizarnos, salir a las calles, construir esa comunidad, esos consejos… tenemos que velar por nuestro presidente y llevar a las urnas a esos abstinentes confundidos.

La lucha sigue camaradas - esto no ha terminado, y el que lo crea así, no merece ser llamado revolucionario.

Pablo Trinidad, Cua, Venezuela


This is a clear message that the Venezuelan opposition has nothing assured, that it wasn’t a convincing victory, and much less an end to the hope of a new, more just, economic and political future.

Nothing has been lost, we will continue and we will advance.

Este es un claro mensaje a la oposición venezolana, que indica que no tienen nada asegurado, que no fue una victoria contundente y mucho menos un final a la esperanza de un nuevo furturo económico y político más justo.

Nada se ha perdido, continuemos, avancemos.

Ángela, Barrio 23 de enero, Caracas

I think that one of the reasons (for the defeat) was the scattered efforts to organize the PSUV on one side, and on the other, the discussion about the reform.

Of six million members, only one million and a bit attend meetings… the PSUV has not been organized, and this confrontation especially found it poorly prepared.

I believe in the PSUV, I believe it is necessary, but also I think it was a mistake to leave the organisation of the party until after the referendum.

Creo que una de las razones fue la dispersion de esfuerzos por un lado con la corformacion del PSUV y por el otro la discusion de la reforma.

De seis millones de inscritos solo asistian a las reuniones un millon y piquito… el PSUV no estaba organizado, y especialmente para esta confrontacion no se encontraba debidamente preparado.

Creo en el PSUV, creo que es necesario, pero tambien creo que ha podido posponerse su conformacion hasta pasar el referendum.

Francisco Acuña, Valencia

Union leaders and workers have to take to the streets to mobilize and fight for the 6 hour work day and the inclusion of the workers in the informal sector.

Our revolutionary process requires and deserves a profound and urgent change. There is no time or possibility for superficial changes. A debate on the great political and economic decisions has to be started with the masses, with social, popular and political organisations, and we need a revolutionary newspaper.

There has to be no more appointed functionaries who are interested in their own personal gain. The role of the Ministers of Popular Power must be usurped, so that the decisions referred to them are debated and decided by those who will be affected by these decisions.

There must be no more salaries that allow (state) bureaucrats to live as though in Saudi Venezuela, buying properties and staying in luxurious hotels. This has nothing to do with socialism, and the workers demand that all those involved in this (corruption), all the inefficient and unscrupulous functionaries are fired.

Those who work for the process (the revolution) those that sacrifice each day, the true workers’ leaders and the social leaders in the barrios, that are part of, and reflect the people, have to be involved.

Los dirigentes sindicales y los trabajadores tenemos que salir a movilizarnos y a conquistar hoy las 6 horas de trabajo y la inclusión de los informales.

Nuestro proceso revolucionario necesita y se merece un cambio profundo y urgente. Ya no hay tiempo ni posibilidades de cambios superficiales. Hay que abrir el debate de las grandes decisiones políticas y económicas con las bases, con las organizaciones sociales, populares y políticas del proceso, y necesitamos un periódico revolucionario.

Hay que terminar con los funcionarios elegidos a dedo que no reflejan más que sus intereses personales. Replantearse el rol de los Ministros del Poder Popular, para que todas las decisiones referidas a cada uno sean debatidas y decididas por las bases involucradas.

Hay que terminar con los salarios de funcionarios que viven como en Venezuela Saudita, que compran propiedades y duermen en lujosos hoteles. Eso nada tiene que ver con un proyecto socialista, y las bases reclamamos la salida de todos los involucrados en este proceso, la renuncia de estos ineficientes e inescrupulosos funcionarios.

Hay que darle paso a los que trabajan por el proceso, a los que se sacrifican a diario desde las bases, a los verdaderos liderazgos obreros y los populares en los barrios, que son parte y reflejo directo de sus sectores sociales.

Union Nacional de Trabajadores sindicalistas, Venezuela


Democratisation of communication is the way that the people can participate in the production and distribution of information through the media, and undercut the 80 per cent of the media that reflects the priorities of capitalism.

This revolutionary form of communication should spread from the masses who support the government - from each battalion, in each consejo comunal, in every community.

La democratización de la comunicación es la vía para que el pueblo participe en la producción y distribución de los mensajes mediáticos, de darse esto no importará que más del 80 por ciento de los medios informativos respondan al modo de producción capitalista. Esta forma revolucionaria de comunicación debe desplegarse desde las bases de quienes apoyan al gobierno - en cada batallón, en cada consejo comunal, en cada pueblo.

María Rivas, Barrio Catia, Caracas

We are not going to hear those opinionated commentators who accused Chávez of being a dictator, an autocrat, a manipulator, gorilla or Castrocommunist - all the insults and lies of the politicians, café society, columnists and editorialists - apologise after the President immediately accepted without any objection the adverse result, but in 2 seconds - crash! - the entire media slander collapsed.

If only Colombia or México could show the same confidence and trust in their (electoral) institutions!

This is the moment to attend to the democratic capacity of the PSUV, changing a strategy that had prioritised quantity over quality, and that had hindered the activists from participating. This is the moment to make internal discussion - the multiplicity of dissident opinions - a democratic requisite.

No vamos a escuchar al grueso de los opinólogos que han acusado a Chávez de dictador, autócrata, manipulador, gorila o castrocomunista - todos los insultos y calumnias de políticos, tertulianos, columnistas y editorialistas - entonar un mea culpa después de que el Presidente aceptara de inmediato y sin ningún reparo el resultado adverso, pero en dos segundos - ¡derrumbó! - la calumnia mediática fracasó.

¡Ojala mostrara el ejército la misma fidelidad institucional en Colombia, en México!

Es el momento de mimar la capacidad democrática del PSUV, revirtiendo una estrategia que ha primado la cantidad a la calidad y que ha impedido que sea la base quien se encuentre con su verdadero instrumento de emancipación. Es el momento de hacer de la discusión interna un requisito democrático, de multiplicar las disidencias.

Juan Carlos Monedero, Madrid, España

What did the opposition win? Not much really. The opposition simply achieved to slow down a little the revolution’s advance that continues as before.

And what did the opposition lose? They lost the few cards they had left - the claims that elections can’t be trusted, that President Chávez wouldn’t recognize the result, that Chavistas are violent. And now, furthermore, they have now declared themselves fervent defenders of the Bolivarian Constitution, which is more a victory for us.


¿Qué ganó la oposición? No mucho, realmente. La oposición simplemente logró frenar un poco el avance de la revolución para quedar igual que antes.
¿Y qué perdieron? Perdieron algunas banderas de las muy pocas que disponían.
Que el árbitro no es confiable, que el presidente Chávez no reconocería su triunfo, que los chavistas son violentos. Y ahora, además, se han declarado fervientes defensores de la constitución Bolivariana, lo cual es más bien un triunfo para nosotros.

What did the revolutionaries lose? A tool to accelerate the advance of the revolution, that maybe wasn’t well explained or was proposed at the wrong moment.

And what did we gain? An increase in our international prestige as an eminently democratic people, with a great democratic leader, and the opportunity to reflect, improve and rectify our strategies before it becomes too late.


¿Qué perdimos los revolucionarios? Una herramienta para aligerar el avance de la revolución, que tal vez no fue bien sustentada o se propuso en el momento equivocado.
¿Y que ganamos? Aumento de nuestro prestigio internacional como pueblo eminentemente democrático, con un gran líder demócrata, y la oportunidad de reflexionar, pulir y rectificar las estrategias antes de que sea demasiado tarde.

What happened was the best thing that could have happened. Considering the adversary that we faced, it wouldn’t have suited us to win the referendum with a small margin. If we were not going to win with a sufficient margin, it was better to lose.

The rapid recognition of our adversary’s victory, without any scheming, was taken by our entire movement in a disciplined manner and saved the country from who knows how much unnecessary violence.

Lo que pasó fue lo mejor que pudo pasar. Ante un adversario como el que enfrentamos, de ninguna manera nos convenía ganar el referendo con un margen estrecho. Si no ganábamos con suficiente ventaja, era mejor perder.

El rápido reconocimiento del triunfo del adversario, sin ninguna mezquindad, fue asumido por todo nuestro movimiento de manera disciplinada y le ahorró al país no se sabe cuantos actos de violencia innecesarios.

Ramón Prada, Caracas


One learns more from defeats than from victories.

The victory of the No could be considered a triumph of fear, of manipulation, terror, ignorance and disinformation.

Now, we should do away with easy slogans and take the ideological battle to the heart of the people.

De las derrotas se aprende más que de las victorias.

El triunfo del No podría ser considerado un triunfo del miedo, de la manipulación, del terror, de la ignorancia y de la desinformación.

Ahora, debemos derribar el slogan fácil y debemos ir a la batalla ideológica profunda en el seno de nuestro pueblo.

Oscar Figuera, Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV), Caracas


The opposition still has no direction, coherence or respect as a political force.

Should the right retake the presidency someday, ensure that revolutionary organisation on the ground, in the barrios, in workplaces, remains strong and independent to protect the gains that have been made.

Colombians expected Chávez, on hearing that the vote was lost, to declare martial law, send tanks onto the streets and soldiers into the TV studios.

To see this guy talking without formalities, without notes, with humour and grace, telling the opposition to enjoy their evening, and even debating the impact of the result in interactions with the people in the audience, openly and honestly, left Colombians a little disorientated.

I think this defeat and the grace in which the Chávistas have taken it will actually go a long way towards undercutting the propaganda war against the revolution.

La oposición todavía no tiene ninguna dirección, coherencia o respeto como una fuerza política.

Los derechistas deben toma la presidencia algún día, asegurar que la organisación revolucionaria - en los barrios, en los lugares de trabajo - permanezca fuerte e independiente para proteger los logros que han hecho.

Los colombianos esperaron que Chávez, cuando el escuchó que el voto había sido perdido, declarara la ley martial, enviando tanques a las calles, y soldados a los estudios de televisión.

Para mirar este man hablando sin formalidades, sin notas, y con humor y gracia, diciéndole a la oposición que disfrutaran su tarde, y aún debatiendo el impacto de los resultados con la audencia, abierta y honestamente, dejando a los colombianos un poco desorientados.

Yo creo que esta derrota y la gracia con lo que los Chavistas han aceptado, realmente lo hará disminuir la guerra de propaganda contra la revolución.

Rocío Jiménez, Bogotá, Colombia


We have been unable to achieve a revolutionary process from below, with high levels of popular protagonism, and the Bolivarian revolution is still essentially led from the top.

Lots of people that are with the revolution, refrained this time from voting because they are being increasingly marginalized by a centralized State revolutionary process. They feel it is not their revolution.

It is a revolution that being handed down to them. They are not the subjects of the process, but its mere objects. And this is what disenfranchised and alienated 3 million potential supporters. This is the wrong path that led us into defeat.

Nosotros no hemos podido lograr un proceso revolucionario desde abajo, con altos niveles de protagonismo popular, y la revolución Bolivariana esta todavía dirigida desde la cima.

Mucha gente que está con la revolución se abstuvo, esta vez, de votar porque ellos están siendo aumentados marginalmente por un proceso revolucionario y centralizado del estado. Ellos sienten que no es su revolución.

Es una revolución que está dándoles a ellos. Ellos no son los sujetos del proceso, pero son los meros objectos. Y esto es lo que causado el disenfranchisimiento y la alienación de tres millones de partidarios. Este es el camino errado que ha dirigido a la derrota.

Teresa Arraíz, Ciudad Bolívar


How can the opposition move beyond its stupid, monotonous and shallow ‘anti-dictator’ mantra? They can't, because they have nothing of substance beyond it to offer.

The revolution has occupied, with its vast and deep program of social reforms, all possible political space.

Besides, as soon as the opposition tries to agree on a proposal that is not just tired propaganda, they will explode into a myriad of fragments.

Nothing truly strategic and positive holds together the opposition's fragile concoction of contradictory and petty motives.

¿Cómo puede la oposición moverse por encima de la mantra estúpida, monótona y superficial de ‘contra-dictador’? No pueden, porque no tienen nada de substancia para ofrecer.

La revolución ha ocupado, con su programa de inmensas y profundas reformas sociales, todo el espacio político posible..

Además, tan pronto como la opocisión intenta estar de acuerdo en un propuesta que no es propaganda cansada, ellos estallarán en una miríada de fragmentos.

Nada verdadamente estratégico y positivo sostiene juntos la mezcla frágil de los motivos contradictorios e insignificantes de la opocisión.

Augusto Piñango, Santa Rosalía, Portuguesa


We haven’t lost anything - just a possibility, but we are going to convince our compañeros, those who have doubts, those who have fears… raise the socialist standard, learn more, unite together, teach, and continue demonstrating through action - more than through theories - what socialism is.

No hemos perdido nada, en verdad perdimos sí una posibilidad, pero vamos a convencer a los compañeros, a los habitantes, a los que tienen dudas, a los que tienen temores… levanta la bandera del socialismo, estudiemos más, compactémonos mucho más, expliquemos más y sigamos ahora demostrando en los hechos en qué consiste, más allá de la teoría, la propuesta socialista.

President Hugo Chávez



Chavez's concession speech:

I prefer it like this. I prefer that it ends like this.

Lo prefiero así. Yo prefiero que haya terminado así.

I am calm, as I hope all Venezuelans are at this moment. Let us all be proud with what we have done, and continue to respect each other.
Now, we must all recognize the decision, the very tiny margin. I say this to emphasis all those who voted Sí and to say to the leaders of the opposition - I sincerely hope you know how to deal with this success.

Estoy tranquilo, como espero que los venezolanos, a partir de este momento, también lo hagan. Estemos todos orgullosos con lo que hemos hecho, cada quien en su ámbito, con sus posiciones, respetando al otro.
Ahora, todos debemos reconocer que es una decisión ahí, muy chiquitica. Digo esto para recordar a quienes votaron por el Sí y a los dirigentes de oposición, mi sincera recomendación de que sepan administrar esa victoria.

I will sleep tranquilly. Those who are going to celebrate should know how to manage their victory. You gained it, but I wouldn’t have wanted such a pyrrhic victory… the vote totals are irreversible, and I recognize that.

I congratulate my adversaries on this victory - it was a hard fight.

For now, we couldn’t… (but) the reform proposal is still alive, it hasn’t died.

Yo dormiré tranquilo. Los que vayan a celebrar que sepan administrar su victoria. Ustedes se la ganaron, pero yo esa victoria pírrica no la hubiera querido. Más bien prefiero que las cifras hayan llegado al nivel de irreversibilidad y sentarme delante de todos ustedes a reconocerlo.
Felicito a mis adversarios por esa victoria; nosotros estamos hechos para una batalla larga. Por ahora no pudimos… La propuesta de reforma está viva, no ha muerto.

I assume the responsibility for not achieving 50 per cent plus one for the proposal - but it nearly achieved it.

It has to be accepted: in Venezuela, despite all the scheming and lies, as President Castro described it a few days ago, a people under fire - under an intense artillery fire of lies and fears - still voted 49 per cent for the socialist project. Despite everything, this is a great political advance.

Yo asumo la responsabilidad de esta propuesta, que no logró el 50 por ciento más uno; pero casi lo logro.
Hay que aceptarlo: venimos de una situación donde en Venezuela no había rumbo político, a pesar de todas las artimañas y mentiras que circularon, como el Presidente Castro lo describió hace unos días, un pueblo bajo fuego - fue sometido a un intenso fuego de artillería de mentiras y temores - sin embargo, que haya votado 49 por ciento por el proyecto socialista, a pesar de todo es un gran paso político.

We continue the battle to construct socialism, within the Constitution. In the proposal there are very audacious ideas, without precedents.
I will not erase a single comma of this proposal. The proposal continues…

Nosotros seguimos en la batalla por la construcción del socialismo, en el marco de la Constitución. En la propuesta hay ideas muy audaces, sin precedentes.
Ni una sola coma de esta propuesta, yo la retiro. La propuesta la continúo haciendo…

We lost 3 million votes - for what reasons? It is necessary to evaluate, although I am completely confident that the immense majority of those people continue with us, those who did not vote Sí. They abstained; had doubts, fears, no time - there was no chance to explain….There are many political factors that we must take into account in this battle… we respected the rules of the game… (and) it is not the first time.

A nosotros nos faltaron 3 millones de votos de personas que no fueron a votar. ¿Por cuáles razones? Hay que evaluarlo, estoy completamente seguro que la inmensa mayoría de esas personas sigue con nosotros, que no votaron por el Sí; se abstuvieron: dudas, temores, faltó tiempo, capacidad para explicar….Hay bastantes elementos políticos que debemos tomar en cuenta en esta batalla… respetamos las reglas del juego… No es la primera vez.

The Chief of State invited the foreign journalists present to this concession, to observe how Venezuela continues speaking openly, with freedom of expression, criticism and demonstrations - as it has always done - and so to cause the accusations of a supposed dictatorship in Venezuela to crumble.

El Jefe de estado conminó a los periodistas extranjeros presentes en la alocución, a observar cómo en Venezuela se continuará hablando abiertamente, libertad de expresión, críticas y manifestaciones, como siempre ha sido, con lo que se desmoronan las acusaciones de una supuesta dictadura en Venezuela.

No more in Venezuela will there be elections as in the past… when the (workers’) Communist vote was torn between Acción Democrática and COPEI. This vote is a demonstration of the credibility and confidence that we have in our Constitution and in the institutions (misions and consejos comunales) that have been created as part of our Bolivarian democracy.

Ya nunca se verá en Venezuela lo que veíamos nosotros en las elecciones del pasado…cuando el Partido Comunista se lo repartían entre la Acción Democrática y el COPEI. Esta es una demostración de la credibilidad que debemos tener en nuestra Constitución y en las instituciones que ha creado, en nuestro sistema político de la democracia bolivariana.

I congratulate those who voted for the proposal and those who rejected it - to those who had doubts, this one (democracy) is the way… I hope they will now spurn, for ever, their nihilistic road to violence, destabilization and ignorance.
Venezuelan democracy is becoming mature and each process that we experience, each political moment, is allowing our country to continue advancing this new Bolivarian project that began in 1999.

Felicito a quienes votaron por la propuesta y quienes la rechazaron - a aquellos que tenían dudas, éste es el camino y ojalá se olviden, para siempre, de las trochas, los saltos al vacío, de los caminos de la violencia, de la desestabilización y el desconocimiento.
La democracia venezolano va madurando y cada proceso que vivimos, cada jornada política, va permitiendo que nuestro país continúe madurando, en este nuevo proyecto Bolivariano que comenzó en 1999.

To paraphrase the Liberator, Simón Bolivar, who, at the moment of presenting the text of Bolivia’s Constitution, said that if it was not accepted, he would bequeath it for the future, the reform proposal is entrusted to the immediate future.

(With this vote) our Bolivarian Constitution, so hard fought for, has finally been recognised by the opposition.

The opposition have to defend the Constitution… I hope (the opposition’s participation in the vote) hasn’t been a momentary political tactic. I want to have faith. We are going to construct the Venezuela that the Constitution reflects.

Parafrasear al Libertador Simón Bolívar, cuando en la oportunidad de entregar el texto de la Constitución de Bolivia, dicho que si no lo aceptaban lo legaría para el futuro, esta propuesta de Reforma la lega para un futuro inmediato.

Nuestra tan luchada constitución…que por cierto, uno de los grandes logros es que la oposición reconoció esta Constitución Bolivariana.
Han salido a defenderla. Espero que no haya sido un recurso momentáneo y manejo electorero. Quiero creer en la buena fe. Vamos a construir la Venezuela que aquí esta reflejada.

Labels: chavez, socialism, venezuela

Chavez loses referendum posted by Richard Seymour

According to the Hands off Venezuela blog, the CNE has announced a narrow victory for NO. Chavez has accepted the result. HOV comments:

in relation to the 2006 presidential elections, the opposition has only increased less than 100,000 votes (thought this is not yet 100% count), while Chávez loses 2.8 million which go to abstention.

Independent polls suggested beforehand that among likely voters, Chavez would probably win it, and furthermore that Chavez's call for socialism to be made part of the constitution was broadly supported. Leaving aside the probably limited effect of 'Operation Pliers', the reality is probably that Chavez's supporters were simply unwilling to turn out to vote for a constitution among whose main priorities was to enhance executive power. This was always the most problematic aspect of Chavez's reforms. Unfortunately, this result will probably strengthen the rightist opposition, despite the continuing popularity of Chavez and his other reforms.

Labels: chavez, cia, socialism, venezuela

Venezuela: hammer, anvil and pliers. posted by Richard Seymour

Entirely predictable and unshocking revelations about the CIA's anti-Chavez campaign have emerged, as I'm sure you've all seen. Chavez is to be assailed on all fronts through violent subversion, electoral chicanery, and the CIA is even looking for a left-flank in Trotskyist opposition to some of Chavez's policies. Bad news for the CIA: the polls (not those from the guys who want Chavez killed), suggest that socialism is supported by most Venezuelans; Chavez is still very popular; and he will probably overwhelmingly win the vote on his constitutional changes. Not all of Chavez's changes are to the good - it is a complex mix, with some measures to consolidate the ten percent of the economy that is common property and bolster grassroots democracy, and other centralising measures that militate against this. Yet, only in the CIA's condescending analysis could it be the case that left-wing criticism of government policy will turn the masses into a despondent, apathetic bloc. Far more worrying is the call for coordinated action with military attaches. This is unlikely to lead to a successful coup on the model of 1973, since Chavez has much of the military on his side. Yet, it can destabilise the society enough, along with contrived economic chaos, to derail the society and force Chavez into a bunkered, bureaucratic corner. As ever, only the combined power of the Venezuelan working class can save the situation: Mike Gonzales has a sharp analysis of the broader political issues here.

Labels: chavez, socialism, venezuela

Colombians devastated at Chávez’s "dismissal" posted by Richard Seymour

Guest post by elpresidente:

Labels: chavez, colombia, death squads, venezuela

Mike Gonzales on Venezuela posted by Richard Seymour

A great discussion of Chavez, the opposition, and socialist strategy in Venezuela:

Labels: chavez, socialism, venezuela

The war on formal democracy. posted by Richard Seymour

Bush unta stimulates wave of terror in Venezuela. Venezuela is unique in that students have long been largely, though not exclusively, pawns of the right, and these ones are tied to far right opposition strong-holds with plenty of cash coming in from Washington DC. The Venezuelan government are naturally suspicious.

Now, I want you to pay close attention to this:

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's proposed constitutional changes go far beyond "reforms." The 69 amendments blessed by the Chavez-controlled legislature last week would eliminate the vestiges of democracy yet remaining in the government.

Chavez could run for re-election indefinitely and concentrate virtually all state power in his hands. Democratically elected in 1998, he could rule as a dictator for decades.

Chavez could run for re-election indefinitely, and yet still be a dictator. Meanwhile, the Spanish King tells President Chavez to shut up in the name of democracy.

Labels: chavez, US imperialism, venezuela

Pilger: War on Democracy posted by Richard Seymour

In case you missed it:

Labels: bolivia, chavez, chile, pilger, venezuela, war on democracy