Monday, November 11, 2013
Historical Materialism panel: Theorising Contemporary Racisms posted by Richard Seymour
This is the audio of the panel featuring myself, Félix Boggio Éwanjé-Épée, and Razmig Keucheyan on the subject of ‘Theorising Contemporary Racisms’. My own segment, on 'Poulantzas and racial states in crisis', is first. Felix’s speech is based on a paper co-written with Stella Magliani-Belkacem, which I will be hosting on this blog.Labels: anti-racism, poulantzas, race, racial formation, racism, state, tea party
Wednesday, July 04, 2012
Marxism 2012 posted by Richard Seymour
Don't forget to come to Marxism 2012, starting tomorrow. There is so much to discuss this year, so many arguments to have, so many people who are wrong about everything, and so much at stake. Greece, austerity, the eurozone, Spain, the coalition, Syria, Egypt, Syriza, Gramsci, Lenin, Althusser, Chinese capitalism, Bolivarianism, the unions, the parties, the bosses, the state, revolution and imperialism. Come. My meeting, you should know, is this Friday at 11.45am, on 'Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism in the Liberal Tradition'. I'll be your badchen for an hour or so, then sign books or talk politics if you want.Labels: althusser, american anti-imperialism, capitalist state, class, egypt, feminism, gramsci, greece, imperialism, lenin, liberal imperialism, marx, marxism, marxism 2012, race, revolution, socialism, trade unions
Sunday, August 02, 2009
How race doesn't perish in America posted by Richard Seymour
So, the story is roughly as follows: someone passing Gates' home notices two men lurking suspiciously near the front door of the place, and suspects they may be burglars. She calls the cops, and when prompted about the 'race' of the possible suspects, says that one of them as possibly "kind of Hispanic, but I'm not really sure", but she didn't see the other one. The police arrive at the residence with this racial profiling in mind. Sgt James Crowley establishes that the person located in Gates' home is none other than Gates himself. He is legally situated in his own house. He identifies himself. He has a Harvard ID. When told to step outside, Gates either emphatically refuses (Crowley's claim) or demands the officer's number and identification which is withheld, and follows the officer to his front porch (Gates' testimony). Either way, he is cuffed, arrested, and charged with 'disorderly conduct' (a nebulous catch-all 'crime' that police use to criminalise anyone they don't like).
Crowley claims that Gates did something to provoke being charged with 'disorderly conduct'. He claims that Gates was constantly yelling, that he wouldn't let the officer radio in the details of his ID, and that he referred to the officer's 'mama' in an off-hand way. He reckons that Gates learned to talk like this from watching 'Good Times' as a little boy. None of this is rank criminal behaviour - but that doesn't matter because it doesn't even appear to be true. The audio doesn't feature Gates yelling and screaming, calling out Sgt Crowley's revered mother, and so on. As Gates himself put it: "Does it sound logical that I would talk about the mother of a big white guy with a gun? I'm 5-7 and 150 pounds. I don’t walk on ice, much less (expletive) with some cop in my kitchen. I don't want another hip replacement." The district attorney, evidently embarrassed by the paucity of evidence, threw out the charges.
Obama - he's a black guy, right? - was asked to say something quotable about it. With his typical smoothness and prevarication he said something that wasn't completely monstrous. He acknowledged the history of police discrimination of African Americans and Latinos. He said that even if the cop wasn't being racist, it was at least stupid and wrong. He said nothing provocative and nothing that wasn't obvious - which turns out to be a relief, as I'm quite sure that either Bubba or Bush would have responded with some empty cracker remarks. The media rounded on Obama - who has surely done enough to demonstrate his low opinion of most African Americans, and black people generally, particularly if they are poor - saying that he had made a gaffe. Their more cartoonish commentariat creations blustered with insensible grief at the idea that there could possibly be a charge of racism made against anyone in America today - Obama is the proof that the whole issue is just some water-cooler talk, or misguided hysteria by folks of a certain chromatic persuasion. The institutions of 'law enforcement' attacked him for sticking his big brown nose in their business. Now Obama, responding to this chorus of who-the-hell-does-he-think-he-is, has invited Crowley along with Gates round to his pad for a beer. Has Crowley demonstrated that he is worthy of such an honour? Is he at least as yielding as the president? No. He thinks he did the right thing, and would do it again. Of course Crowley won't apologise. He can't possibly, even if he thinks he was wrong, because he would be letting the boys down. He would be letting people think that there is something wrong with smacking a black man around in America.
Frank Rich, a fairly typical NYT liberal, thinks that the institutions of white supremacy (he doesn't call them that) are panicking, because soon America will be a white minority country. He says that the pretence that there is no racism, coupled with the insistence that the real racists are black people, expresses blind terror about the sunny post-racial future that awaits America. But this doesn't make any sense. As David Roediger has pointed out, whiteness can be 'earned' in a manner of speaking; it can be 'worked toward'. Just as the Irish became white, just as Jews became white, just as Italians and Poles and Hungarians and other migrants from non-Anglo Europe became white, so can Hispanics - some of them, anyway, enough to keep that supposedly expansive middle class teeming with 'whites', though there may be a confusing and vexed journey as this solution to the 'race question' is elaborated. The real issue is not fear that demographic change will neuter the racists. The attempt is what it always has been - to maintain the prolonged, and only partially successful counterrevolution against the gains of the Sixties. To ensure that race does matter, by pretending that it doesn't. To ensure that the class system that they so admire, the system of 'free enterprise' with its colour-coded allotment of rewards and privileges, is strengthened. And to convert every anti-racist movement, including the vote for Obama, into an alibi for white supremacy. Once they veiled themselves in hoods and cloaks. Now they veil themselves in ostentatious 'colour-blindness'.
Labels: class, david roediger, obama, race, racism, us politics
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
"Bombing Civilians: An American Tradition" posted by Richard Seymour
Marilyn B Young, who has written well on imperialism and the global 'colour line', has co-edited a new book on the history of American bombing. This is an excerpt from the book:Airpower embodies American technology at its most dashing. At regular intervals, the air force and allied technocrats claim that innovations in air technology herald an entirely new age of warfare. Korea and Vietnam were, so to speak, living laboratories for the development of new weapons: the 1,200-pound radio-guided Tarzon bomb (featured in Korean-era Movietone newsreels); white-phosphorous-enhanced napalm; cluster bombs (CBUs) carrying up to 700 bomblets, each bomblet containing 200 to 300 tiny steel balls or fiberglass fléchettes; delayed-fuse cluster bombs; airburst cluster bombs; toxic defoliants; varieties of nerve gas; sets of six B 52s, operating at altitudes too high to be heard on the ground, capable of delivering up to thirty tons of explosives each. A usual mission consisted of six planes in formation, which together could devastate an area one half mile wide by three miles long. Older technologies were retrofitted: slow cargo planes (“Puff the Magic Dragon”) equipped with rapid-fire machine guns capable of firing 6,000 rounds a minute; World War I– era Skyraiders, carrying bomb loads of 7,500 pounds and fitted with four 20-millimeter cannon that together fired over 2,000 rounds per minute.
The statistics stun; they also provide distance. They are impossible to take in, as abstract as the planning responsible for producing them. In Korea over a three-year period, U.S./UN forces flew 1,040,708 sorties and dropped 386,037 tons of bombs and 32,357 tons of napalm. If one counts all types of airborne ordnance, including rockets and machine-gun ammunition, the total tonnage comes to 698,000. Throughout World War II, in all sectors, the United States dropped 2 million tons of bombs; for Indochina the total figure is 8 million tons, with an explosive power equivalent to 640 Hiroshima-size bombs. Three million tons were dropped on Laos, exceeding the total for Germany and Japan by both the U.S. and Great Britain. For nine years, an average of one planeload of bombs fell on Laos every eight minutes. In addition, 150,000 acres of forest were destroyed through the chemical warfare known as defoliation. For South Vietnam, the figure is 19 million gallons of defoliant dropped on an area comprising 20 percent of South Vietnam—some 6 million acres. In an even briefer period, between 1969 and 1973, 539,129 tons of bombs were dropped in Cambodia, largely by B-52s, of which 257,465 tons fell in the last six months of the war (as compared to 160,771 tons on Japan from 1942–1945). The estimated toll of the dead, the majority civilian, is equally difficult to absorb: 2 to 3 million in Korea; 2 to 4 million in Vietnam.
Labels: bombing, colour line, imperial ideology, race, US imperialism
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Lacanian phallacies posted by Richard Seymour

"Following Freud, Lacan proclaims 'the absence in women of fetishism.' What is the logic of this second disavowal? In Lacan's texts, women are doomed to inhabit the tongueless zone of the Imaginary. We are forbidden citizenship in the Symbolic, exiled from the archives and encyclopedias, the sacred texts and algebras, the alphas and omegas of history. If women speak at all, it is with male tongues, as ventriloquists of phallic desire. If we look, it is with a male gaze. In this way, Lacan's vision bears an uneasy affinity to the nineteenth-century discourse on degeneration, which figured women as bereft of language, exiled from reason and properly inhabiting the prehistory of the race. For Lacan, as for the discourse on degeneration, women's difference is figured as a chronological one; we inhabit an earlier space in the linear, temporal history of the (male) symbolic self. Pre-oedipal space (the space of domesticity) is naturalized by figuring it as anachronistic space: out of time and prior to symbolic history. Women's historically gendered relation to power is represented as a formally different relation to time: the imperial gesture itself.
"According to Lacan, women do not inhabit history proper. We bear a prepositional relation to history. We are pre-Oedipal and pre-Symbolic, permanently threatening the male Symbolic with our painted faces and unruly hair. Yet in this theory we are incapable of ever really disrupting anything. Just as, in imperial discourse, white men were the sole heirs to the grand narrative of historical progress, so in Lacanian discourse, men are the sole heirs to the Symbolic. While the discourse on degeneration invented imperial nature top underwrite racial, class and gender difference, Lacan invents the ineffable majesty of the 'phallic signifier' governing all social difference, a structural universal, unchanging and inevitable.
"Women in Lacan's schema are assigned the position of victim, cipher, empty set - disempowered, tongueless, unsexed. Identified inevitably with the realm of the Other, women are the bearers and custodians of difference but are never the agents and inventors of social possibility. For precisely this reason, we can be the objects of fetishism but never the subjects. To remain in the Imaginary is to become psychotic, the condition of the madwoman, hair wild. But if woman is Other, how does one begin to talk (as a woman) of different power relations between women, not to mention those between socially empowered women and disempowered men? When we speak and act as different women, the Self/Other dichotomy begins to totter and relations with the Other become relations with others.
"Lacan shares with imperial discourse the image of woman as riddle. All too often, colonials represented the colonized landscape as feminine, unknowable and unrepresentable. So too in Lacanian theory the feminine is an unrepresentable absence effected by a phallic desire that grounds the signifying economy through exclusion. Women become the Dark Continent, the riddle of the Sphinx - exoticized and implicitly racist images drawn from an Africanist iconography. Constructing women and colonized people as a riddle ("the Woman Question", "the Native Question") allows privileged European men to answer the riddle in terms of their own interests." (Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest, Routledge, 1995, pp. 192-3).
Labels: feminism, imaginary, imperialism, lacan, race, real, symbolic
Sunday, February 22, 2009
Make it go away posted by Richard Seymour
In an analogous fashion, international relations has been the subject of an energetic white-washing. As a discipline, and as a discourse that frames policymakers' decisions, the problems central to IR have been always been Eurocentric. After all, the obsession with strategies for maintaining an equilibrium between sovereign states, coupled with a tautological reading of the character of such states as 'power-maximisers', has its origins in the writings of David Hume, whose original contribution was to universalise the interests and behaviours of emerging European states. Maintaining that states were sui generis institutions, essentially the same from the Greek city-state to the modern nation-state, and that sovereign states had ontological primacy in world affairs, his narrative rendered invisible that majority of humanity which he, in other writings, racially denigrated.
Imperialism was similarly not among the predicaments of IR when the discipline was launched in 1919, that year of Wilsonian 'national self-determination' (after which colonialism continued to expand, reaching its apogee by 1947). This was not because the institution of race was disavowed. Quite the contrary: global jurisprudence in 1919 was explicitly imperial, colonial and racially-laden. The dichotomy in positivist jurisprudence between civilized and non-civilized states asserted that law did not apply outside the small family of existing sovereign states. The emerging institutions of liberal order were also underwritten by explicit codes of racial solidarity. Woodrow Wilson's remarks on the launching of the League of Nations at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference are worth excerpting:
"We, Anglo-Saxons, have our peculiar contribution to make towards the good of humanity in accordance with our special talents. The League of Nations will, I confidently hope, be dominated by us Anglo-Saxons; it will be for the unquestionable benefit of the world. The discharge of our duties in the maintenance of peace and as a just mediatory in international disputes will redound to our lasting prestige. But it is of paramount importance that we Anglo-Saxons succeed in keeping in step with one another." (Quoted in Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, Routledge, 1998, p155.)
This was crucial to Wilson's rationale for rejecting the proposed 'racial equality' clause. Parenthetically, it is only fair to state that any interest Wilson ever had in the idea was circumscribed by his own devoutly held belief in racial inequality, expressed in his support for Jim Crow in Washington, his paternalistic arguments for empire in the Philippines, and his writings on governance and statehood. So, if race and empire were not officially recognised as problems in international relations, it was more because they were taken for granted than because it was necessary to cleanse the territory of such incriminating associations.
Post-war Realism in IR was different. Not by accident or design, but as a consequence of its function, Realism coded imperial pursuits in the language of power-balancing, maintaining an equilibrium between the US and the USSR. Just as anticommunism was the official ideology behind America's attempts to variously manage, curtail, and coopt decolonizing movements, so the sacred Balance of Power was its strategic rationale. If the US sought to repress national liberation movements through the proliferation of right-wing dictatorships, this apparent conflict with the objectives of liberal internationalism could be rationalized as a necessary balance to Soviet assertiveness in supporting Kim Il-Sung, Castro, the Viet Minh, etc. To the extent that decolonization was important at all to Realism, it was only in the sense that European sovereignty was apparently being extended to what is still called the Third World. And once formerly non-sovereign peoples were assimilated to the order/anarchy of sovereign states, their susceptibility to external intervention, exploitation and so on was just one more vista onto the Hobbesian tragedy of world affairs. The dominant ideas concerning order, the sovereign, the international, and so on, were thus gradually expunged of their racial content. The fact that decolonization did not ultimately end relations of dependence or the imposing inequalities of power and resources that were generated by the colonial system could be delicately effaced in the language of development and modernization theory. The fact that a caste of formerly colonial powers still determine under what conditions the sovereignty of a state outside that caste is abridgable, has equally been interpreted as the right of 'democracies' over their 'totalitarian' opposites.
The norm has thus been established that it is bad form to notice how world affairs continue to be conspicuously structured by race. The failure to notice, though, is so laboured, and so arduous, as to demand attention and explanation. There is a whole genre of literature waiting to be written here.
Labels: colonialism, imperialism, international relations, race
Thursday, December 25, 2008
Racism after Obama. posted by Richard Seymour

I'm afraid I was too late with my entry to the ReadySteadyBooks symposium, but I did want to draw attention to David S Roediger's How Race Survived US History. It is an extremely timely argument about the enduring significance of 'race' in American society, as well as a sophisticated polemic against the complacent assumption that the Obama phenomenon spells the end of American racism. As the title implies, Roediger is interested not only in the origins of racism, and the way that it has been perpetuated and resisted, but particularly in how it managed to weather challenges, from the revolution to the civil war and 'jubilee', to the civil rights movement and its long-term results, including the election of Obama. After all, as he points out, "black males born 27 years after the most important civil rights acts, are estimated to have a 29% chance of imprisonment, more than seven times that of whites born in the same year". 224 years after the Declaration of Independence with its "created equal" clause, blacks and Latinos suffered poverty almost triple that of the white population. Over half a century after Brown v the Board of Education, 'apartheid schools' still flourish in America. Obviously race does matter, despite the emotional eulogies that followed Obama's victory.
To understand this, Roediger investigates the origins of 'possessive whiteness' as a legal and political doctrine that helped circumvent class struggle in the Virginia colonies and elsewhere, the Lockean arguments for slavery and colonialism, and the use of 'race' to manage and stratify the labour market. He takes issue with the simplistic arguments of the free market right, that racism was somehow inappropriate for capitalist development, acting as fetters to successful accumulation. According to the neoconservative canon, capitalism undermines racism by promoting abstract labour (everyone's muscle is the same regardless of skin pigmentation), and preferring supposedly more efficient free labour, But capital, Roediger notes, has profited most not by reducing the workforce to 'abstract labour' as per a certain blinkered marxist orthodoxy, but through the production of differences within labour - differences organised by gender, nation, race, and religion. This is crucial for the development of 'white republicanism', in which the egalitarian aspirations of white, working class Americans were successfully redirected into support for a hierarchical and exploitative system based on white supremacy. As for preferring free labour, slaver capital generated immense profit from the commodities whom they worked and traded. Northern capital also benefited, as did some of the North's elite universities. Northern liberals were as a result unwilling to seriously challenge that structure - so much so that in the early years of the Civil War, Lincoln insisted that defecting slaves were in fact nothing more than "contraband" who should be restored to their owners. It was only the pressures of military necessity on Lincoln, and a mass strike by slaves themselves, with some 200,000 of them leaving their erstwhile masters and rallying to the Union cause, that effecrtively guaranteed abolition.
Capital, north and south, would come to bitterly regret the experiment in democracy in the Reconstruction period. Though it was not possible to re-impose slavery, the new nationalism of the turn of the century did unite liberals and reactionaries in support of depriving African Americans of the vote (and thus of means to ameliorate their situation), and introducing segregation. There is, of course, a great deal of bad news for liberals in this book. Drawing partially on the work of Ira Katznelson, Roediger details the impact that official liberalism's collusion with white supremacy meant that federal programmes advocated under the New Deal were also means by which forms of segregation and deepening racial inequality were advanced. The racist components of the New Deal and, later, the Fair Deal are given a robust airing here. Even the exigencies of the Cold War, and the need to respond to decolonization, did not lead to mainstream liberals being willing to fundamentally challenge the one-party, racist southern power bloc until LBJ took bold measures that both abolished legal segregation and introduced reforms to undermine the poverty that, as he knew, was partly a legacy of past Democratic administrations. Though inherently self-limiting because these programmes depended on prolonged growth, and were deprived of the billions that were wasted on committing genocide in Vietnam, these reforms mattered enough that the Republican party made itself their most aggressive opponents. It was at this point that older racist discourses were re-coded in the language of the market, with welfare and affirmative action treated as 'reverse racism', as if existing inequality was meritocratic. Moreover, racial inequality was reinterpreted in terms of the mythology of the bootstraps, in which all immigrant groups in America do eventually embrace the American way of doing business, gain status and become mainstream: those that do not must be dysfunctional. It became an article of faith among rightward-moving liberals and the right, especially after Daniel Patrick Moynihan's report on inner city unrest, that black families lacked the virtues that made their white counterparts more efficient. Thus, a whole set of discriminatory practises in the economy and in criminal justice were naturalised as the efficient product of a free market and a just society, and by and large the Democrats capitulated to this discourse.
One odd weakness of the book is that the focus on domestic US history tends to leave the international, or rather imperial, component of American racism under-examined. Roediger is quite clear that racism was forged in a context of empire. However, the discussion of racism in US foreign policy, though by no means marginal to the topic, is rather slight in the book. A crucial aspect of liberal nationalism in the 'Progressive' era was the overcoming of American sectionalism by binding the Southern racial order to an imperial policy largely driven by Northern liberals. Roediger lucidly details the complex relationship between Cold War anti-communism and anti-racism, in a way that is much more sophisticated than Mary Dudziak's arguments. However, ne aspect of that anticommunism in power that Roediger overlooks was the way in which racist tropes permeated foreign policy thinking. One of the major headaches of post-war US governments was the achievement of what they frequently referred to as "premature independence". Eisenhower insisted that Arabs could not understand "our ideas of freedom or human dignity". This style of denigration returned in a 2003 State Department document which insisted that "the towel heads can’t hack" democracy. In this connection, it is surely telling that Obama has been more often vilified as an 'Arab' or a 'Muslim' than as an African American. Imperial culture must have a great deal to do with the survival of race in American history. Even with this caesura in mind, however, Roediger’s book provides a compelling and concise answer to the question of how race has persisted, and why it will survive the Obama phenomenon.
Labels: 'obamamania', class, david s roediger, imperial ideology, obama, race, racism, us working class
Sunday, August 24, 2008
The blackness of Dessalines posted by Richard Seymour

In the comments to the post below, it is pointed out that the early outstanding strike against white supremacy was the Haitian revolution. It was also pointed out to me that when it comes to subverting the racial order, there is no better example than Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the first ruler of an independent Haiti:
All Haitians, - Ayisyen yo - "shall hence forward be known only by the generic appellation of "Blacks." (See, Dessalines' 1805 Constitution).
Thus, in Dessalines' Haiti, "Black," is deracialized. We all now know that race is purely a social construct with no scientific grounds. The truth is there is just one race, the human race. But back at its creation, the country of Haiti was based on this truth.
For, Dessalines defined those who fought for the abolishment of chattel slavery in Haiti and against colonialism, including the few whites that did fight on the side of the Africans, as "Blacks." To study Dessalines' life, achievements and first Constitution is to come to know that a "Black" is a person (no matter his/her skin color, European or African) who stands for freedom, human dignity and against slavery, colonialism and imperialism. No ideal in this modern world so directly confronts and conquers the biological fatalism of white privilege. In Dessalines' 1805 Constitution, all Haitians are "known only by the generic appellation of "Blacks." And "Blacks" included even the Polish and Germans who fought with the African warriors on the side of liberty and equality, not slavery, plunder and profit. Black people in Dessalines' Haiti are "lovers-of-liberty" who are willing to live free or die. To reiterate, there is no modern philosophy or ideal that has so directly provided the world with an ALTERNATIVE to the manufactured "race game," based on skin color, as this Dessalines ideal.
The Constitution of 1805 declared that no white, of whatever nation, could set foot on Haiti as a master or owner of property. This was reasonable enough: the last time they came in that guise, they totally wrecked the place and turned it into the most miserable slave colony in the world. But white people were in fact permitted to stay and be naturalised as Haitians - namely, those who had fought alongside the indigenes. But they would be referred to as "black", not white. This was partly a domestic strategy to defuse the tension between newly freed black Haitians (nouveaux libres) and those mulattoes who had been freedmen under the French empire (ancien libres). Indeed, it was Dessalines attempt to redistribute the estates confiscated from the French to the nouveaux libres that raised the ire of the ancien libres and led to his assassination in 1806. But in effect as well as in intent, it subverted the very idea of 'race' by interpreting blackness as a mode of social equality, not of natural hierarchy.
Labels: black, haiti, jean-jacques dessalines, race
Wednesday, May 30, 2007
Decoy posted by Richard Seymour

For about three decades (I guess) there has been a fruitful engagement with the question of 'the nation' and nationalism from radical and marxist critics - people like Benedict Anderson, Tom Nairn, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Gopal Balakrishnan and so on. Yet, with the honourable exception of a few, like Partha Chatterjee, there has been little effort to integrate a 'gendered' interpretation of the nation. This is odd. As Nira Yuval-Davis points out, women "reproduce nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically". This isn't an optional extra, something that nation-states can rather live without. The "imagined community" is itself reproduced in the locus of the household, the first scene of socialisation and individuation, as much as in the print, visual or internet media. The "mother tongue" is taught there. Indeed, nationhood is often spoken of in the tropes of family, the household, and parenthood: the ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’; the homeland; the national ‘family’. Angelika Schaser's study of the patriotic German women's movement in the 'Second Reich' remarks that for many Germans, national feeling was itself "an extension of family feeling". The familial trope, as Anne McClintock points out, has several uses: it sanctions a national hierarchy as at the same time an organic unity, and it offers a "single genesis narrative" for the nation. It has also had its extension in the colonial metaphor of a "family of black children ruled over by a white father". And, to avoid any confusion, I'm using 'gender' here simply in the way that feminists usually do: in Yuval-Davis's terms, gender is a "mode of discourse" relating to groups of subjects whose social roles are "defined by sexual/biological difference". Gender is not biology, and it is not destiny. It structures social life, but only to the extent that it is reproduced as a discourse.
Male-only nation
Practically every new nation that was founded denied women citizenship rights, specifically the suffrage that was allotted to males, always with an apparatus of gendered 'role' allotments. I take most of my examples here from the Kaiserreich (Germany 1871-1918), because that's what I'm studying - but also because it is a fascinating example in itself. In Imperial Germany, as Schaser puts it, "the nation-state was composed of male individuals". Only men had the right to vote and bear arms, men were in executive control of the family, men had superior education. Women belonged to the world principally through the family, while men accessed the world through a variety of vital channels. The ‘natural’ boundaries for women were drawn around the three ‘K’s – Kinder, Kuche, Kirche (children, kitchen and church). Under the Civil Legal Code (initially elaborated in the 1870s, but finally made law in 1896), married women had no say in child’s education, and all property or money in marriage became the husband’s responsibility. The code states: "the husband takes the decisions in all matters affecting married life". The practise of abortion carried a 5 year sentence, and woman suspected of prostitution had to undergo examination by the ‘Morals Police’ (Sittenpolizei), while male clients faced no such humiliation. The state placed the full responsibility of the consequences of sexual interaction on women, while apportioning the full ownership of its benefits to men. Aside from that, the prohibition on abortion can be seen as an effort to exert strict control over the reproduction of society. This, of course, is not unknown: in the Soviet Union, which was the first country to legalise abortion in 1920, abortion was outlawed again in 1936, at the height of the mass deaths from famine and repression, and only legalised again in 1955. In Israel, as Yural-Davis - herself an Israeli dissident - points out, abortion rights are severely restricted and rather controversial with the right-wing, in part because of the 'racial' or - to put it more euphemistically - 'demographic' struggle with Palestine. She also recalls that females who chose sterility were upbraided by for inviting "national death" and "race suicide" by one Theodore Roosevelt (this at a time when the United States government was practising a crude form of eugenics). 'Race', of course, with its trope of extended family, of blood-lines and originary human communities, of purity and decadence, is the sina qua none of a highly gendered nationalism. The raciological dimensions of nationalism were to become even more apparent in the Third Reich, but then again they were hardly suppressed in an America that had recently wiped out the indigenous population and had enforced white supremacy as the political code of the southern states. In fact, I'm tempted to push the 'race' angle even further here because it's well-known that the more conservative elements of oppressed groups internalise the discourse of their oppressors. Isn't it the case with certain forms of Islamism that they accept that theirs is a problem of sustaining the 'race' against attack by Western society, in which they must maintain strict heterosexist patriarchical family norms? Hence the homophobia, the carefully defined place for women, the conservative moralising about drugs etc? Anyway, Imperial Germany's draconian criminalisation of prostitutes can certainly be seen as a reaction to the dramatic rise in that profession during the latter half of the 19th Century, but that itself was in part a consequence of urbanisation, industrialisation and the fluctuations of German capitalism. Once again, conservatives feared decadence in the ‘race’, of both a medical and moral character. Gendered laws were therefore partially about conserving German society even as it went through a process of traumatic 'modernisation'. In respect of family life, the Civil Code had rolled back some previously regressive local laws, which feminists had campaigned against: it removed the right of men to physically punish women or determine when children should be weaned. Yet it also allotted most parental rights to the father – the control of the child’s financial affairs, its education, the choice of profession, the choice of marriage partner. Once again, once notes two different affirmations here. On the one hand, conservative moralism held that it was motherhood was a woman’s assured place in society, the naturally endowed condition, and on the other it was prepared to seriously reduce their power to carry out that task. On the other hand, for the sake of race survival, the state was concerned to ensure the reproduction of strict patriarchical norms through successive generations.
Well, these policies were nothing more than natural, 'common sense', a function of Geschlechtscharakter (the character of the sexes), in which a system of binary oppositions sustained the sexual division of labour in the household and the nation. For example, Meyer’s Grosses Konversationslexikon (1904) described the following distinctions between male and female: “in the female, emotion and sensibility, in the male, intelligence and thought predominate; the imagination of the female is livelier than that of the male, but seldom achieves he heights and boldness of the latter”. Similar oppositions also emerge in dictionaries and encyclopaedias from 19th Century Germany: ‘male’ power versus ‘female’ beauty; ‘male’ volatility versus ‘female’ inwardness; ‘male’ loudness of desire versus ‘female’ quiet longing; ‘male’ acquisitiveness versus ‘female’ preservation; ‘male’ public life versus ‘female’ private life; ‘male’ activity, willpower and bravery versus ‘female’ passivity, weakness, fickleness and modesty; ‘male’ rationality versus ‘female’ emotionality; ‘male’ doing versus ‘female’ being etc. (Karin Hausen, ‘Family and Role Division’ in Richard J Evans and W R Lee eds, The German Family, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1981: 51-53). When the German League to Combat Women’s Emancipation (or Anti-League) was formed in 1912, it deemed the project of equality between men and women "an attempt to do violence to nature, which has clearly segregated the proper realms of both sexes everywhere and has ordained a strict division of labour": these dichotomies operate to naturalise a social state of affairs. The salience of the private, inward and domestic in the production of ‘feminine’ tends in two directions, reinforcing an ideal of family-bound behaviour as well as obedience toward the patriarch. For, what the Anti-League objected to was not simply the limited and tentative demands raised by the moderate Bund Deutscher Frauenverein (BDF), but the very idea of women’s activity beyond the household. Their entering the realm of power-broking and conflict was itself the perversion of a ‘natural’ order of ‘female’ sensitivity, emotionality, delicacy and so on. The Anti-League here forcefully articulated a hegemonic norm of Wilhelmine Germany. Political passivity was requisite. Only in 1908 did women gain right to join political party or even attend public meetings, in all states of empire. The right to vote for Reichstag elections was not secured until 1918. It took, in other words, the defeat of a neurotic, unstable, patriarchical capitalist hierarchy groaning with paranoia and insecurity, by socialist revolutionaries. It took the defeat of an empire burdened with an outlandishly expensive and insular aristocratic military caste, saddled with hypertrophic militarism and paraphilia (the uniforms, the medals, the symbols) at whose apex was a man whose very status could be rocked by the mere suggestion of association with homosexuality. (Wilhelm's friend, the musician Philip Eulenburg, was alleged to have been engaged in such a triste, while there is ample evidence that his 'Liebenburg Circle' was a homoerotic 'Mannerbund' in the fashion suggested by Nicolaus Sombart. As Sombart himself puts it, the German ruling elite was existentially bound to its commitment to 'premodern' solutions, unable to deal with challenges rationally - preferring to demonise problems and plot bloody civil war to defeat them. The consequences were "neurotic": the "hypertrophy of the superego as an internalised factor for social control" in which the superego is monarchical, masculine, militaristic; the censorship of the id, protecting the ego from its drives, which are "canalised and limited to that minimal sexuality necessary for reproducing the species" so that both sexuality and the female are repressed; the id is experienced as a constant threat, and its demands manifest as political programme. The superego’s injunction not to absorb these demands produces a repressed, "squashed" ego, prone to "distorting visions of anxiety". For the male seeking to escape this dilemma, the Mannerbund - whether that sodality be a ruling circle, or whether it be the army - is one mode of escape.)
What the duck is for
As Zillah Eisenstein points out in her new book 'Sexual Decoys', the dilemma is different today. The ruling class has become more apt at manipulating both 'gender' and 'race' roles. For although the United States has its fundamentalist revanchists who would dearly like to make Kaiser Wilhelm look like a liberal, and although the GOP tries to satisfy that constituency as part of its electoral coalition, there is universal suffrage for both sexes, gender roles are more varied, women may take up more roles in the military and in government, and many formal impediments have been removed. Even as Bush promotes 'chastity' and non-contraception in AIDS-rich countries, even as his right-wing supreme court appointees continue to oversee the rollback of abortion rights (incidentally, all GOP presidential candidates publicly favour repealing Roe v Wade, including Rudi who would be 'okay' with it), the administration cannot dispense with its purloined 'feminisms'. Bush's administration has promoted women, and Condoleeza Rice has been one of its most aggressive and prominent members. Laura Bush has been pressed into the service of 'liberation' for women in Afghanistan, even if the US's main allies in that country are warlords known for their brutal treatment of women. Similarly, in the military, women's roles were revealed in Abu Ghraib where Brigadier Karpinski and Lyndie England took the rap and the heat for the state violence that they had helped perpetrate. What is their role here? Precisely, that of the decoy.
For, it is not good enough to say, "Bush lies, we know he doesn't really care about these things, why waste time dissecting it?" It isn't coincidental that, precisely as black women in America catch the flak for its ills (as per that disgusting phrase "welfare queen") at the same time as they experience the worst of them (poverty, infant mortality, preventable disease etc), the frontwoman for Bush's racist and patriarchical programme of conquest is a black woman. Similarly, as Eisenstein goes on to argue, the role of the Englands and Karpinskis is precisely to mask the masculinism and women-hatred that is central to America's own hypertrophied militarism. It isn't a huge secret that women in the US military are being raped more and more frequently by their male counterparts, or that the US military relies upon the services of sexual slaves wherever the park up. Similarly, Hilary as a frontwoman (or Obama as a frontman) for a party devoted to capitalist-imperialist interests, would be a well-timed pitch - coming as it does when the Democrats have demonstrated their unwillingness to break with the Bush-led imperial mission in Iraq, much less Afghanistan, Somalia and beyond.
This decoy is a symptom, a distraction, and a warning. It signifies, on the one hand, the total paucity of resources available for truly creating equality of even the limited, liberal-capitalist variety. It also diverts fire: precisely as a certain amount of sexism was relied upon when England and Karpinski were made patsies for Rumsfeld and the Pentagon, the Bush administration is happy to rely on racism and sexism drawing criticism toward Condoleeza Rice (she looks so evil, after all). Oh, and also a bit of snobbery too, if you fancy a giggle at Bush's malapropisms: anything to keep your eye off the dollars. Finally, it says that someone means you harm. The classical wooden duck decoy, supposedly designed to lure real ducks out in front of a gunman who would then happily plug away at the innocent little saps, is now car boot sale material. They have better ones to catch you with.
Labels: 'war on terror', capitalism, feminism, gender, nationalism, race, socialism










