Hope in the Shadow of Catastrophe. posted by Richard Seymour

A Reply to Explananda

The title of this post deliberately mimics that of an essay by Norman Geras, originally published in the New Left Review and subsequently as one of a collection of essays called The Contract of Mutual Indifference. Some of you will have already gathered that I omitted the word ‘socialist’, since complete mimicry would be a diversion from my main topic. To malinger on the theme somewhat, Geras’ essay is an inspection of exactly what kind of hope socialists are entitled to given what we know about human nature, especially in light of the Nazi holocaust. Brutally summarised, Geras advances a view of human nature that is, he hopes, both realistic and compatible with socialist transformation. Human beings can be bad, they do have these capacities – it is no good reducing it to the evils of the economic and political order, because what systems of power work on precisely are the capacities that already exist within human beings. The fact that the response to the extermination of millions of human beings in the centre of modern Europe could provoke, among other things, active participation or just plain indifference is a fact of no small significance. Human beings are - have been - overwhelmingly available for cooption, tyranny, exploitation and so on.

Since, for Geras, a libertarian political order of the kind envisaged by Marx and his followers would free human beings not just from oppression but from curtailments to their capacity for evil, it would follow that such an order would afford endless opportunity for new abuses. Therefore, he concludes, a socialism that is compatible with human nature would have to express itself in a liberal polity, with all the capacities for policing, imprisonment and coercion that this entails. The socialist transformation which did not result in elated utopia but rather in the basic satisfaction of each human being’s basic needs would still be revolutionary in the face of what persists daily. If I have not missed my guess, this is the source of Geras’ conversion to what he calls “liberal Marxism” . (More here ).

Why start with this? Because Chris Young , who has taken up his sword against me, is something of an admirer of Geras, and I thought it would be a nice touch to introduce the argument thus. To recapitulate, Chris Young differs with me profoundly on the question of whether we should support the Iraqi resistance, and hope for their victory against the US army. His argument is that a victory for the resistance would be disastrous for Iraq, probably leading to a Hobbesian war of all against all, only to be settled by the victory –decisive or otherwise – of one particular faction of the resistance. Tyranny would most probably ensue, thus undermining the only benefit that has so far accrued to Iraqis as a result of this war – that is, the elimination of the worst manifestations of dictatorship and the possibility of stable and democratic future development. As he puts it:

My prediction - which partly underlay my opposition to the war - is based on the fact that Iraq is rich in resources, deeply unstable, and has potentially exploitable ethnic and religious differences (notice I did not say "seething ethnic hatreds"), among other things. I having been hoping that the U.S. could somehow manage to find a process inclusive enough to handle the various tensions here, because I have seen that as the only conceivable way of avoiding a civil war. That doesn't mean that I want the U.S. to achieve all its goals. Rather, I want them to begin such a process, because no one else now can, and then be forced to the sidelines by a healthy process within Iraq that they can't control.

Although Chris sympathises with Iraqis demanding that US troops leave, he broadly supports the process of transition being carried out by the Interim Governing Council.

To Omdurman!

Having tersely summed up two arguments that I disagree with in various ways, I’ll get on with my own argument. The “shadow of catastrophe” in this case, needless to say, is precisely the possibility to which Chris alludes. We don’t have to think very far into the past to get a taste of what this would be like – torture chambers, secret police, executions, rigid fear, the possibility of perpetual war. However, the immediate problem that I have with Chris’ analysis is that the Iraqi masses seem to be entirely passive players, not active participants in a highly mercurial situation. Various sects, under the rubric of the ‘resistance’ fight it out with the Americans, then squabble murderously over the spoils – while the rest of Iraq awaits its fate at the hands of the victor. Either that, or they are so schismatic as to be vulnerable to collapse into ethno-religious rivalry the second troops depart. I don’t think either scenario fits well with the data emerging from Iraq.

The demonstrations of Iraqis chanting “No, no Sunni; No, no Shi’ite; Yes, yes Islam!” is one manifestation of the tendency toward greater Iraqi Arab unity, (the Kurds are another matter altogether). Similarly, the development of a pan-Iraqi anti-occupation party which plans to stand in elections signals the willingness to overlook ethno-religious differences in the effort to oust the occupying forces. Now, Chris accepts all of this, but argues that:

I think Nikolai is absolutely correct that loathing of the U.S. has increased feelings of Arab unity in the Iraq. But I am also convinced that he is just wrong to think that that effect will hold or that we're not looking at a very probable civil war in the next 2 or 3 years.

There are, he says, too many ethno-religious differences susceptible to manipulation by demagogues and opportunists. This is doubtless true. But given that the tendency at the moment is in the opposite direction, what reason does he have for thinking unity will not hold? I'm afraid that what he alludes to is only a possibility among others, and not in my view the most likely one.

Moreover, what are the demands of the resistance groups? Precisely the things that the ‘coalition’ continually promise, yet hopelessly procrastinate over as they spy the nationalist writing on the wall: elections, the withdrawal of troops, a complete handover of power to the elected body, and the future of Iraq to be determined by Iraqis. Instead they are to get a continued military occupation, a secret police trained and run by the CIA and a legislative body (elected or otherwise) which will be beholden to the laws already imposed by the occupying forces. I will stipulate at this point that the ‘resistance’ I am referring to emphatically does not include the Al Qaeda affiliated cells operating in Iraq. Their goal, as they advertise it, is to brew civil war between Sunni and Shi’ite, in the hope of suppressing the growing power of the Shi’ite majority whom their Wahabbi sect considers serpiginous, un-Islamic etc. Their ideology and goals specifically confound the aspirations of the majority of Iraqis, and they should be opposed. That's a beginning to answering Chris' moral consideration of the resistance. I do consider it legitemate for an anti-occupation movement to target the occupiers and their adjuvants, although certain acts (if, in fact, civilians happen to have been the target) merit criticism.

The Language of Contradiction

In supporting the resistance of Iraqis, what I want to see is Iraqis wrest control of their future from the American and British occupiers. The key to this lies in a fatal contradiction in US policy in Iraq. They wanted to impose their authority on the Middle East as part of a geopolitical strategy for ensuring the future dominance of America in the world. Iraq was attacked as the weak link in a chain of Arab states with hostile or ambivalent regimes, precisely because it did not have the capacity to put up serious resistance. The plan for Iraq included the usual tenets of neo-conservative thought – privatisation privileging US corporations , de-regulation and elections following a suitable period of transition. (Although I have said, and still suspect, that the concern with ‘democracy’ was a PR front in the war, it nevertheless has its own weight in neo-conservative thinking. It is just that democracy can almost be conflated with free markets in their purview.) However, the commitment to some form of democracy was always an ancillary concern to the overall objective of ensuring a regime that was friendly to US prerogatives in the region. Rumsfeld, an old-fashioned American nationalist, prevails in this discussion over neo-conservative ideologues like Wolfowitz.

The result of this contradiction is that Iraqis have been freed, and then entrapped. They have been told they are liberated, then had their newspapers shut down, their media locked in a state-run strangle-hold, their affairs run by an unrepresentative puppet regime, their cities pounded by an unwelcome occupier and surrounded by barbed wire fences. Iraqis are now free enough to take umbrage at their oppression: You Westerners imposed this Saddam monster on us in the first place – now that you get rid of him, for your own sakes, you expect us to gratefully rally round and accept your diktat? This is what is driving the resentment and resistance toward the occupiers. Not political or religious extremism, although these have their role, and certainly not ‘foreign’ agitation.

For all of these reasons, the “catastrophe” scenario is only one among many in my view, and not necessarily the most likely result of a victorious uprising. Similarly, the “benign” scenario is also one among many outcomes of a victory for the United States (although, as it happens, the US has now lost so much that even if it gets its way, it cannot proclaim an undiluted success). I think it likely that a puppet government, or even one whose legitimacy is diffuse, could be beset by perpetual crises – just as the Kirzai government in Afghanistan is. The difference is that, since this is America’s test-case for the “preemptive strike”, it has been necessary to pour vast amounts of money into Iraq to make it a success, thus far without much hope. This has been compounded by an unavailing resort to extreme force in the most heated zones of engagement. An unrepresentative government, or one with only “limited” powers, does not look likely to be any more successful at thwarting these problems.

Coda

What are we entitled to hope for, knowing what we know about the balance of forces within Iraq? Is it reasonable to insist on the full self-determination of Iraqis given the likely result? Is it feasible to believe in the liberatory potential of an Iraqi uprising? Who is to guarantee that the moral character of a post-insurgency regime will be superior to that of the IGC? Who is to say it will not be worse? Is it really necessary to withhold good will from the IGC which, for all its flaws, is struggling to do its best for its country? To be perfectly honest, I know of no ontological guarantee as to the future of Iraq. For one thing, the success of an uprising would completely alter the coordinates within which any future settlement could be worked out. I do believe, however, that the successful transition from an IGC to a nominally representative state with few powers and many puppets will relegate Iraq, for the time being, to a low-rent client state. A subordinate to be used and impoverished through “liberalisation” and “structural adjustment” even more vigorously than those states which are not under any kind of imperial control, (India, Argentina, Zimbabwe). Knowing what I know about those states, I think it is worth the risk. There is one final reason to support the victory of the insurgents. If the United States succeeds, even partially, in imposing its will on Iraq, this will ensure its capacity to wage further wars with even more destructive consequences. Already the sabre is being rattled at Syria, which is, apparently, an “extraordinary” threat to America. Where next for the Empire if it does not meet its match in the sands of Iraq?