Kissinger and Chile, or, the Mechanics of a Propaganda Cover-Up. posted by Richard Seymour

Commentary has recently published a column by a “scholar” from the American Enterprise Institute rehearsing some well-worn arguments concerning US involvement (or lack, thereof) in the coup which replaced elected President Salvador Allende, a self-professed “Marxist” with dictator General Pinochet. In the main, it involves a spurious defense of Henry Kissinger, based partially on a reading of telephone transcripts not currently in the public domain but which the impish Kissinger has kindly allowed him to peruse in advance. Drawing selectively on declassified documentary evidence, he claims to construct a case against Kissinger’s indictment and against any blame being apportioned to the Whitehouse either for the death of General Rene Schneider or the coup attempt in 1973. He compares his suggestions to Christopher Hitchens’ book The Trial of Henry Kissinger and also a BBC documentary with a similar name. Unlike Falcoff, I’ve read the book and watched the film. So the gaps that emerge in his account prove relatively simple to fill.


The Myth That Will Not Die
By Mark Falcoff


ARTICLES
Commentary
Publication Date: November 1, 2003

“The 30th anniversary of the coup d'etat that deposed Chile's Marxist president Salvador Allende has come and gone, but not without a burst of accusations of American complicity with--if not responsibility for--that event. Even before the commemorations had gotten under way, Secretary of State Colin Powell took it upon himself to apologize for the U.S. role in Chile, though in terms so vague as to leave many wondering exactly what he was referring to.”

Colin Powell’s apology could hardly have referred to anything less than the known US attempts to subvert Chilean democracy, plot a coup, “remove” an army general too constitutionally-minded to allow a coup, provide munitions and money to putschists etc. It might additionally refer to involvement in the 1973 coup or to the support provided by the United States to General Pinochet as he destroyed his opponents – Operation Condor being an egregious example.

“In an editorial titled "The Other September 11," the New York Times, with characteristic condescension, reminded its readers that "our nation's hands have not always been clean" and managed to suggest a smoking gun ("the United States . . . laid the groundwork for [the coup] and supported the plotters") without actually producing one.”

Is Falcoff suggesting that a) the US did not lay the groundwork for a coup, and b) did not support the coup plotters? As it transpires, yes, he is. And we’re about to discover a world of imaginative cover-ups and omissions.

“The name invariably linked to our Chilean involvement is that of Henry Kissinger, today the leading survivor of the Nixon administration and at the time the evident architect of much of its foreign policy, first as National Security Adviser and then as Secretary of State… In addition to his supposed role as the intellectual author of the coup, Kissinger has been accused in both film and book of responsibility for the murder of General Rene Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean army--that is, of homicide.”

In fact, the film was quite straightforward in saying that we would perhaps never know to what extent Kissinger was involved – one of the reasons for which was Kissinger’s concealment of evidence relating to that period until five years after his death. Hitchens himself avers that Kissinger “wanted the removal of General Schneider by any means and by any proxy”. He holds Kissinger responsible for the kidnapping and for arming a selected crew of violent fanatics to carry out the task, with good reason as we shall see. He emphatically does not assert direct authorship of the assassination, although he does point out that if you are responsible for a kidnapping, during which the captive is murdered, it does you no good at all to plead this in court. Anything that happens to a person while being kidnapped only compounds the crime.

"Chilean politics past or present is not a particular specialty of Americans… But neither is Chilean politics a specialty of Christopher Hitchens, the New York Times, or Le Monde. As we shall see, their interests would appear to lie largely elsewhere."

It would be amazing, truly, if the NYT and Christopher Hitchens did not have ulterior motives in claiming US involvement in Chile – but anyone hoping to discover by the end of Falcoff’s article what this sinister or mercenary motive is will be disappointed. He does not follow up on the promise of “As we shall see…”.

“The starting point for the Chilean drama was a presidential election that took place in September 1970 … Such presidential elections, with no candidate receiving an absolute majority, were common in Chile. The constitutional procedures of the day specifically mandated that, instead of a runoff between the two leading candidates, the winner was to be selected by the Chilean congress, scheduled to meet several weeks hence. Although the legislature was not strictly required to opt for the frontrunner, firm custom suggested that it would do so.”

Civics lesson 101. Pay attention, class.

“What raised the stakes in the 1970 race was the presence of Allende himself, a man with strong Soviet-bloc and Cuban connections and even more sinister associations within Chile's far Left. Consequently, between the election on September 4 and the congressional vote on October 24, Chile was awash in rumors and plots, most of them related to efforts to block Allende's accession to power.”

I hope you heard that. Allende’s fault, you understand? Just what these “sinister associations” with the far Left are supposed to be, we discover later – he enjoyed the “critical support” of the MIR, a far left organisation who had previously questioned the capacity of parliament to deliver social change. Apparently, enjoying the support of a small revolutionary party counts as a “sinister association”.

“In Washington, meanwhile, President Richard Nixon was hardly pleased by the prospect of an Allende presidency, and was taking steps to prevent it.”
Quite. Here is what steps he was taking:Kissinger, having completed discussions with Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi-Cola and David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan bank, took to the Oval Office with Richard Helms, where Nixon outlined his ideas:
“Not concerned risks involved. No involvement of embassy. $10,000,000 available, more if necessary. Full-time job, best men we have … Make the economy scream. 48 hours for plan of action”.

Kissinger set up a group in Langley, Virginia, with the aim of pursuing a Two Track strategy. Track One would pursue ordinary diplomatic means, while Track Two would pursue destabilisation, kidnap and murder.

“The findings of the Church committee exonerate the administration of unlawful activity--a noteworthy fact in light of the circumstances that both the chairman and the majority of the members (and, even more, their staffs) were unremittingly hostile to the Nixon White House and anxious, if possible, to find embarrassing linkages between it and events in Chile.”

That is certainly noteworthy, but not for the reasons Falcoff assumes. We’ll come to the legal position in a while, but note the assumption that if US law allows it, it must be okay.

“There is another primary source as well. In 1998, the Clinton administration was moved by the arrest in London of Allende's successor, the dictator Augusto Pinochet, to order the (heavily redacted) declassification of some 17,000 official U.S. documents relating to the period... In fact, however, the Clinton declassifications are less rich in information than the findings of the Church committee, which was able to examine the documentary record in its unexpurgated form and also to interrogate the participants under oath.”

Participants having never been known to lie, under oath…

“Nor do the Clinton declassifications contribute anything particularly useful to the case against Kissinger. Some of them actually corroborate the findings of the Church committee, and, what is even more ironic, support Kissinger's own version of events as laid out in the relevant volumes of his memoirs.”

False, in fact, and absurdly so given Kissinger’s notorious habit of falsifying the past in his weighty tomes. We’ll see exactly why in short order.

“Records of Kissinger's telephone exchanges, covering the entire span of his government service … All of them have been given by him for inclusion in the Nixon Library. Although the records relating specifically to Chile are not yet in the public domain, they will be before long, and he has kindly let me review them in advance.”

Kissinger’s transcripts relating to Chile will be in the public domain “before long” – if Falcoff knows when Kissinger is going to kick the bucket, we would all be in his debt if he told us. That would make any law suits much more urgent. However, does it raise any concerns that Kissinger allows Falcoff, alone, to “review them in advance”? And if they are for inclusion in a future Kissinger book, they are almost definitionally fictitious, knowing Kissinger’s tendency to falsify the record in his own good favour.

“First and foremost, these transcripts establish that Chile was not an important part of the then-National Security Adviser's daily diet.”

A transparent diversionary tactic. Whatever his level of involvement, however much else he had to do – and Falcoff helpfully gives examples of Kissinger’s busy schedule – we know that he was involved in the US activities in Chile.

“This point is crucial, not least because in the BBC film we are continually being told that Kissinger micromanaged every detail of American foreign policy.”

We are not.

“In fact, during September and October 1970--which is to say, between the Chilean election and the congressional vote the telephone record reveals a Kissinger preoccupied with [checklist of all US foreign policy concerns in 1970]. Thereafter, there is nothing at all until June 1973, when he and Nixon discuss a failed military revolt against Allende, and then no further references until after Pinochet's assumption of power with the September 11 coup.”

This tells us two things. One, Kissinger had a wide remit, and many tasks (a number of which Hitchens deals with in his book). Two, Kissinger and Nixon were concerned with the “failed military revolt” – which they wished had succeeded.

“President Nixon was indeed deeply distressed at the prospect of an Allende presidency in Chile, and on September 15, 1970, he summoned Kissinger, Attorney General John Mitchell, and CIA director Richard Helms for a meeting in the Oval Office to discuss the matter… Nixon was determined to "save Chile" from Allende "even if the chances [were] one in ten." At this meeting there was even loose talk about spending $10 million to provoke a coup…”

Hardly loose talk. This was anxious planning, with Nixon determined to “make the economy scream”, using “the best men we have” etc.

“Helms remonstrated with the President that … only a "slight possibility" existed of a move by senior elements of the country's military to block his confirmation. "Moreover," Helms recalls in his posthumous memoir, A Look Over My Shoulder (2003), "I noted that the [CIA] lacked the means of motivating the military to intervene." But the President was unmoved: "Standing mid-track and shouting at an oncoming locomotive," recalls Helms, "might have been more effective."”

Truly, a generous rendering of what transpired. Nixon seeking to “save Chile” from its own democratic decisions has, apparently nothing to do with his administration’s association with US corporations frightened of what may happen if Allende became President. If Nixon was stubborn on the matter, however, so was Kissinger – apprised, by Richard Helms and Thomas Keramessines, then director of covert operations in Chile, of the slim chances of success in kidnapping Schneider (and pinning it on leftists), Kissinger insisted they continue with the plan.

"Convinced that a conventional military uprising was still not possible in Chile, the CIA, acting with the approval of the 40 Committee--the body charged with overseeing covert actions abroad--devised what in effect was a constitutional coup. The most expeditious way to prevent Allende from assuming office was somehow to convince the Chilean congress to confirm Alessandri as the winner of the election. Once elected by the congress, Alessandri--a party to the plot through intermediaries--was prepared to resign his presidency within a matter of days so that new elections could be held."

Such an option [Track I] was pursued with limited conviction of its likely success. But what Falcoff calls a "constitutional coup" actually involves bribery. Odd that he failed to mention this. Moreover, the claim here isn’t even that a “military uprising” would not be desirable, merely that it was “not possible”. This perception did not prevent them from trying, however.

“In the meantime, even as the U.S. embassy in Santiago was pursuing the "Alessandri gambit," an alternative line of activity was being looked into by the CIA station in Chile. This policy, later labeled Track II (to distinguish it from the constitutional coup), involved finding a general or generals who, if President Frei and the Christian Democrats would not play the role assigned to them, would overthrow the outgoing government, dissolve the congress, and send the president into temporary exile. Then the interim junta would call elections (at an unspecified but presumably early date) in which President Frei could return and run against Allende.”

This unlikely scenario is probably fictitious. It is meaningless to overthrow an “outgoing administration”, as Falcoff dishonestly phrases it. It is the “incoming administration” that is the target. And why should Frei participate in subsequent elections, apparently to be granted by the military if their result was meaningless? That is, if the only way he could win was through public coercion? And what of Allende? Were he even to be invited to participate in new elections, who would risk voting for him given that it would eventuate a coup?

“The search for a military man brought the CIA station into contact with General Roberto Viaux, who had been cashiered from the Chilean army in 1969 for leading a revolt against the Christian Democratic government (ostensibly in protest over military salaries and benefits). Since his dismissal, Viaux had continued to conspire, but with larger ideological and political objectives in mind. In early October, by which time Track I had run out of gas, he informed his CIA contacts that he was planning another coup and asked for a sizable drop of arms and ammunition.”

What in fact had happened was that Eduardo Frei had signalled his opposition to US involvement in Chilean elections, which prompted Kissinger to seek the assistance of Viaux, whose “larger ideological and political objectives” derived from his association with the fascist group Patria Y Libertad, unmentioned by Falcoff.“After subsequent discussion, the CIA decided Viaux was not a good bet, though it kept him on a long leash, disbursing some cash and even taking out an insurance policy on his life. Another group of generals was eventually selected for the task at hand.”But they did supply machine guns and tear gas grenades to Viaux’s men, not seeming concerned about what they would be used for. Viaux’s men were to “kidnap” Rene Schneider, this prompting a coup, but what “kidnapping” requires machine guns and tear gas?

“The chief obstacle to Track II was General Rende (sic) Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean army. His view, simply stated, was that since the politicians had gotten the country into the mess in which it found itself, the politicians would have to find a way out.”

What this “mess” is supposed to be, we cannot be sure. But this offhand way of expressing Schneider’s dedication to the Constitution speaks a great deal more about Falcoff than about Schneider.

“When Schneider proved intransigent, the intermediaries tried to persuade Prats, again to no effect. The architects of Track II then focused on circumventing Schneider by kidnapping him and sending him to neighboring Argentina for a season while the political situation was adjusted.”

The “architects of Track II” including Kissinger, for the record.

“As far as Kissinger (and, for that matter, the White House) was concerned, Viaux had been told to stand down, and that was presumably the end of active American coup-plotting.”

In fact, Viaux was told: “We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you together with all your friends can do something. You will continue to have our support”.

Presumably, then, not “the end of active American coup-plotting”, and certainly not an instruction to “stand down”, as I will elaborate in just a moment.

“As Kissinger told Nixon by telephone on October 15, reporting on a meeting with Thomas Karamassines of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division, "This looks hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing would be worse than an abortive coup." … The message was delivered through an intermediary, leaving the CIA with the pious hope that once its wishes had been made known, Viaux would respect them.”

Perhaps not “pious” – we are talking about state terrorism after all.But the memorandum of the conversation from October 15th includes both the planned message to Viaux, cited above, and the suggestion that the coup was to be de-fused “at least temporarily”.

And furthermore, “the meeting concluded on Dr Kissinger’s note that the Agency should continue keeping pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight – now, after the 24th October, after the 5th November, and into the future until such times as new marching orders are given”.

It is absolutely vital that you read the next paragraph extremely carefully:

“Unfortunately, the cashiered Chilean general was pursuing agendas of his own. The kidnapping itself, which took place early on the morning of October 22, was badly bungled. Schneider resisted by extracting a handgun from his briefcase, provoking his abductors--mostly young and inexperienced--into shooting first, wounding him in four vital areas. Viaux's people panicked and took flight, some discarding their arms near the scene of the crime. The general was rushed to the capital's military hospital, where he died three days later.”

Here is the big cover-up! The kidnapping began on October 19th, and involved not just Viaux, but also Valenzuela’s men. This attempt failed, because Schneider left in a non-official car. But the CIA headquarters in Washington responded, not by repeating their advice that the plot be terminated, but by offering Viaux and Valenzuela $50,000 each to have another go. They did, on October 20th, and failed. The US supplied machine guns were transferred on October 22nd for Valenzuela’s men to try, but later that day Viaux’s men successfully kidnapped and killed General Schneider.

This was not “the cashiered General” “pursuing agendas of his own”. This kidnapping was backed all the way from Washington, but Falcoff’s careful omission of crucial details would not let you know this.

“Much has been made of the fact that between October 15, when Kissinger ordered the Viaux coup "turned off," and the death of General Schneider, the CIA station in Santiago continued to make preparations for a Track II-type coup. Thus, at some point in mid-October three submachine guns and some tear-gas canisters and gas masks were shipped to the Chilean capital through the U.S. diplomatic pouch and passed to Colonel Paul Wimert, an American military attache, who in turn gave them to officers representing General Camilo Valenzuela, head of the Santiago garrison. This was the group that had intended to kidnap General Schneider. The exchange occurred at two in the morning of October 22; but before any use could be made of the weaponry, General Schneider lay dying in the hospital”

No. As noted, Washington supported the later kidnapping attempts and paid for them in cash. Even allowing that they had hoped Viaux would simply obey orders, they were willing to sponsor Viaux’s men provided they could get the job done. The worry never was about the morality of the kidnapping, merely its efficacy.

“A Chilean military court subsequently found that Schneider had been killed by handguns, and the Church committee concluded that these weapons "were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators." The committee also noted that an unloaded machine gun had been found at the site of the killing, but professed itself "unable to determine whether [it] was one of the three supplied by the CIA." Schneider was therefore killed by conspirators who, although in contact with the CIA, were acting against its direct instruction, and apparently without its logistical assistance.”

This is a lie. Probably, in fact, a perfectly conscious one. Schneider was killed by men acting with CIA backing and money. The kidnapping involved men from both Viaux’s group and Valenzuela’s group.

“Just why the Chilean kidnapping plot went forward after Kissinger issued orders that General Viaux be "turned off" is not clear … Kissinger, at any rate, seems to have been unaware of the second plot--that is, the one for which the three machine guns were sent down. In 1975, after testifying before the Church committee, Karamassines phoned the National Security Adviser and reported that he had been "asked . . . if I cleared everything in advance with you. I said no, you were too busy." In the same conversation, Kissinger remarks that, although he did not know about the second plot, he might have approved it. Then he adds: "I thought that after we turned off that one thing [the Viaux plot], nothing more had happened and in fact that other thing [the Schneider kidnapping] had happened."”

Kissinger “seems to have been unaware of the second plot” although he “might have approved it”. The morality of such a plea is monstrous. It is also devious:

Brian McMaster, a career CIA agent, had been employed to deliver “hush money” to Viaux’s men after the assassination. Col Paul Wimert has testified that he himself was obliged to retrieve the guns and payments made to Valenzuela and Viaux – guns and payments made by the CIA to suborn the kidnapping and trigger a coup. Moreover, there isn’t the attempt to “turn off” the coup, described by Kissinger and taken at face value by Falcoff. The message to Viaux tells him to preserve his assets, remain prepared, and he would have another stab at it another day. The 15th October memo also discourages Viaux from “acting alone” and speaks of continuing to “encourage him to amplify his plans”. They should “encourage him to join forces with other coup planners so that they may act in concert before or after 24th October”. Which is exactly what Viaux did.

CIA headquarters in Washington cabled Santiago on the morning of the 20th October asking for urgent action because “Headquarters must respond … to queries from high levels”. Keramessines testifies that “high levels” referred to Kissinger. It was following this cable that payments were made to Viaux and Valenzuela. The CIA acknowledges that one of the Viaux associates who evaded capture approached them in November 1970 and requested $35,000, which they duly gave him not only to keep a contact secret (read “quiet”), but also for “humanitarian reasons” – quite a humanitarian sum at 1970 Chilean prices.

“In short, deplore as one might the interventionist intentions of Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA, the fact remains that General Schneider was murdered as the result of a botched kidnapping attempt, which--as far as the White House was concerned--had been disavowed and ordered shut down a full week before it happened.”

Terrorist intentions. Let’s not use pithy euphemisms here. And, of course, we don’t know if it was a “botched kidnapping attempt”, because we have only the assassins’ words that Schneider resisted, thus provoking their ire. But we do know that the White House had not “disavowed” or “shut down” the kidnapping at all.

“Even more has been made of a CIA cable dated October 16 instructing the Santiago station to tell Viaux that, although he was to stand down, he should "preserve [his] assets" and would "continue to have our support" if he joined forces with others either before or after Allende's inauguration and amplified his political planning for the future, in fact, Viaux played no future role whatsoever in Chilean politics. He was arrested almost immediately after Schneider's murder and sentenced by a military court to a long prison term. In August 1973, he was released and sent to Paraguay; neither he nor any of the officers involved in his plot was involved in the September 11 coup. When he finally returned to Chile, six or seven years later, the Pinochet government offered him no special consideration.”

Mark the careful elision. The assets were preserved, not for the September 11th coup, but for the kidnapping and assassination of Rene Schneider, with the aim of prompting a coup in 1970. If the Nixon Whitehouse had its way, the military would have been running Chile’s affairs long before 1973.

“Neither Hitchens's book nor the film upon which it is based takes note of a crucial fact: namely, that the Schneider debacle had precisely the opposite effect of what was desired by the CIA and the Nixon administration…”

The success of the coup attempt has no bearing at all on who is guilty for it, of course. Stating the historically obvious is an irrelevancy to be indulged by those who prefer to omit the more biting facts.

“Kissinger has been charged with criminal responsibility not just for Schneider's assassination. He has also been charged with criminal responsibility for Allende's overthrow and death three years later”.

As the BBC documentary did not make that charge, one can only assume he is referring to the Hitchens book which does indeed hold him “criminally responsible” for the coup inasmuch as the policy pursued while he was Secretary of State laid the groundwork for the coup and lent support to the post-coup administration.

“In the fall of 1970, Nixon certainly talked tough, at least in private, telling Kissinger by phone on October 15 that if Allende were to take office, "I am not going to do a thing for [Chile]," and that if he dared to nationalize U.S. property, "then we cut him off." Not surprisingly, a National Security Council memorandum (November 9, 1970), drafted several days after Allende's inauguration and released in the Clinton declassifications, called for a "correct but cool" public posture toward Chile … "maximiz[ing] pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests."”

“Make the economy scream” were, I believe, his words when Allende won the vote. And he followed up on his threats, as we will see.

“Specifically, the memorandum advocated eliminating financial guarantees for U.S. private investment in Chile; terminating existing guarantees where possible; bringing "feasible influence" to bear at multilateral lending institutions; and offering no new commitments of bilateral economic aid. (Humanitarian aid was to be considered on a case-by-case basis.)”

"Meanwhile, however, an "options paper" on Chile (November 3, 1970), sketching how these policies were to be implemented, included two provisions not mentioned in the memorandum. The first was "to give articulate support, publicly and privately, to democratic elements in Chile opposed to the Allende regime by all appropriate means." The second was to "maintain effective relations with the Chilean military, letting them know that we want to cooperate but that our ability to do so depends on Chilean government actions."The former provision laid the groundwork for the transfer of at least $ 6 million in covert support to non-Marxist political parties, newspapers, radio stations, and oilier groups during the Allende period. Thanks to these transfers, Allende found it impossible to eliminate his political competition by confiscating the sources of their funding or by intentionally bankrupting independent newspapers or radio stations through politically inspired strikes. Without the American subventions, Chile's pluralistic political system--including an independent press and electronic media--would in all probability have disappeared long before General Pinochet and his associates overthrew the government and installed a dictatorship of their own."

This piece of dishonesty is to be relished, for several reasons. One, “American subventions” were aimed at overthrowing “Chile’s pluralistic political system”, not supporting it. Two, Allende had neither the desire, nor the ability “to eliminate his political opposition”. The most serious charges against Allende are that he acted unconstitutionally in nationalising companies without sufficient compensation (although Allende's argument that the companies had been more than compensated in excessive profits drawn at the expense of Chilean workers can easily pin the constitutional argument), and that he criticised and sought legal action against El Mercurio, which it is claimed he hoped to shut down. Given that El Mercurio was being funded by a hostile power (the CIA) to disseminate fabrications at the expense of the administration, and Allende personally, while supporting coup attempts, we can easily render a judgment on this. Just conduct a simple mental experiment - and pretend that El Mercurio is a radical leftist newspaper in the USA, sponsored by the KGB, which uses it as a vehicle to disseminate lies about the United States Government and politicians, calls for military coup and attempts to destabilise a government. How long would it last? Three, the economic and political destabilisation of the country “through politically inspired strikes” was in large measure the policy of the US government, not of Allende. Note also the decision to maintain close links with the Chilean military, a not insignificant factor in the later coup as we will learn. Project FUBELT involved covert operations against the elected, democratic government of Allende. It is therefore untrue to say:

“The documentary evidence is thus unambiguous: the most serious charge that can be levied against the Nixon administration is that it contemplated economic sanctions against Chile at a time when Allende had yet to lay a hand on American investments in the country and was still making payments on Chile's debts.”

Falcoff expends a great deal of words telling us how lenient the US was on an official level. Aid was never suspended despite the nationalisations of the copper industry. Chile defaulted on its loan, “a de facto relief measure for the Allende regime … greater by many orders of magnitude than that tendered to the Frei administration” (although it is hard to see how the US can be creditted with this). Chile was also able to draw over $100 million from the IMF (although, again, this was “over the protests of US representatives there”).

“The one area where U.S. aid increased threefold during the Allende period was military assistance. If this sounds sinister, two crucial facts should be borne in mind. First, the aid relieved pressures on the Chilean budget, allowing money that would otherwise have been used for weaponry and training to be diverted to improved housing allowances and other amenities for the uniformed services. Second, Allende himself welcomed this assistance, which permitted him to boast, truthfully, that Chile's armed forces were better off under a Socialist-Communist government than under its Christian Democratic predecessor.”

So, it was a humanitarian measure to help the schools, and Allende wanted it anyway. If it truly was a humanitarian gesture, we wonder why the US would want to aid a government they so clearly despised and had plotted to oust. And what message would Allende have sent to a hostile military had he refused the aid? The only remaining question is exactly for what purpose the aid was intended, given the US priority of destabilisation and coup?

Falcoff doesn’t answer, and presumably would rather not speculate. He does feel qualified enough to talk about the real causes of the coup. September 1973, he avers, was the result of “the devastating collapse of the Chilean economy” and “Chile’s increasing polarized political environment”. That both of these factors were in large part the result of US covert activity you would hardly guess if you had to rely on Falcoff’s interpretation of the evidence.

Allende, he notes, assumed the presidency “in an atmosphere of euphoria and even good will almost unimaginable in retrospect”. The times were radical, and even the centrist Christian Democrats had a leftwing ready to work with Allende. But:

“Instead, intoxicated by ideological triumphalism, Allende's people did everything they could to split the Christian Democrats, luring the party's left wing over to the governing coalition while wreaking political vengeance on the rest. As Allende supporters seized factories and farms throughout Chile, Christian Democratic workers were dismissed and their union leaders refused access to the premises. Political discrimination even extended to nonpolitical individuals for family reasons; the son of President Frei, an engineer, found himself in difficulty when his workplace passed into the hands of government "intervenors."”

It is true that Allende supporters took control of the farms and factories where they could, and established cordones, workers’ committees aimed at running things for themselves. It is not true that this was the specific result of an Allende policy. In fact, Allende's policy as of mid-1972 had been to try and soothe business leaders and moderate elements by cracking down on these moves. Labour strikes against rightwing corporations were broken by the Allende government, as it sought to preserve the stability of the system - caught between capitalism and revolution, it opted for capitalism.

“The net effect of these actions was, paradoxically, to discredit the "collaborationist" leadership of the Christian Democrats and bring about its replacement with more conservative figures. By 1973, the party had been pushed into a tactical electoral alliance with the Right, a development that would have been unthinkable three years earlier. In March 1973, in the last parliamentary election held under Allende, the combined Christian Democratic-Conservative list won a thumping 56 percent of the vote.”

Mark the careful misrepresentation – the combined Christian Democratic-Conservative list in fact won a smaller share of the vote than in 1970, while Allende’s vote increased from approximately 36% to 44%. The difference was that the centre had shifted to the right, for reasons we’ll come to. The result is also misconstrued because its importance lies in the fact that the rightist forces failed to get the two thirds bloc they needed to oust Allende – one reason why the Generals opted for a coup in the end.Falcoff goes on to list a variety of ways in which Allende apparently harassed small business, curtailed the freedom of the press and manoeuvred the country toward a totalitarian communist state.

At no stage does he mention Project FUBELT , a campaign of political destabilisation, and economic sabotage originating from 1970, but continuing through to the 1973 coup. Here are some examples of what took place:

Before Allende’s election, the CIA drastically increased its propaganda tempo in Chile (already quite massive since 1964), putting out over 700 articles, broadcasts, editorials and similar items through the Latin American and European media. They told the military that there would be a cessation of US aid in the event of an Allende victory. They told business owners that just about everything near, dear and holy would be conscripted to the service of the communist state. The result was a sharp dip in the economy. (Covert Action in Chile, 1963-73, a Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Agencies (US Senate), 18th December 1975 , p23, p25).

And, for all the alleged generosity of the American government, feebly adumbrated by Falcoff, what we actually discover is a mass economic boycott organised through the Export-Import Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank. New US aid to Chile dwindled to almost zero, while financial assistance and guarantees to American companies investing in Chile were cut back drastically. The effect was not only to deprive the Chilean economy of the investment it had relied on for some time. It also meant that American suppliers would not provide parts to Chilean businesses (taxi firms, bus companies, trucking firms, copper and steel etc), even when cash was offered up-front. (Edward Boorstein, Allende’s Chile, An Inside View, New York, 1977; Adam Schesch and Patricia Garrett, “The Case of Chile” in Howard Frazier ed., Uncloaking The CIA, New York, 1978; Senate Report, pp 32-3).

Food and equipment shortages resulted. Cigarettes, bed sheets, soap, all became difficult to get hold of. And then we have the strikes. Falcoff mentions the "strikes" as if they were pure home-grown labour rebellions, but they rarely involved labour and they certainly weren’t home-grown.

He mentions, for example, that in October 1972, an association of private truck owners launched a strike against the government, refusing to move supplies up and down the country in the hope of bringing the economy and infrastructure to a standstill. They even included in their embargo newspapers which happened to support the government. They were shortly joined by shopkeepers who shut up their shops, bus companies who refused to allow their vehicles onto the road, and walk-outs by white collar workers. The reality is, of course, that much of this could not have been sustained without the assistance and agitation of the CIA. (Time, 30th September 1974; Senate Report, p 31).

The CIA also trained more than 100 members of Chile’s professional associations and employers’ guilds at a school in Virginia run by the American Institute for Free Labour Development (a CIA front organisation). The AIFLD had a long history of experience in fomenting economic disruption and strike-breaking. (AIFLD: Fred Hirsch, An Analysis of AFL-CIO Role in Latin America, California, 1974; NACLA’s Latin America and Empire Report, October 1973, p 11).

Shortages, of course, had been worse before. The Allende government had introduced a free milk programme because of the malnourishment of over 600,000 children. But these were communist shortages, or so the story ran.

“By that time, Allende's problems had become so acute as to merit notice once more by the President of the United States. The immediate occasion was a failed military plot against Allende that had been quashed by loyalist troops. Nixon and Kissinger discussed the matter by telephone on July 4, 1973. Not surprisingly, the President expressed regret that the coup failed ("if only the army could get a few people behind them!"). For his part, Kissinger told the President that "we had nothing to do with it."”

“For the next two months, no further phone conversations took place between Kissinger and the Nixon White House on the subject of Chile. Not until the events surrounding the September 11 coup did they resume.”


Whether the US was involved in the failed coups or not, the evidence strongly suggests involvement in the 1973 coup. Take, for example, the Situation Report of Patrick Ryan , a US military attaché in Chile, in which he describes the coup as “close to perfect” and “our D-Day”. Ironically, Falcoff mentions this Situation Report only to draw the comment that the decision to undertake a coup was taken very reluctantly and with a lot of soul-searching by all involved.

“Contrary, then, to what the film The Trials of Henry Kissinger suggests, there was no straight line between the events of 1970 and the coup of 1973. Rather, conscious choices by Allende and his own people drove the military into action that it would normally have been disinclined to carry out.”

Having avoided the best part of the historical record of US involvement in Chile, Falcoff now claims that it was “conscious choices by Allende” that caused the coup, not those of the CIA or the US government.

“As for President Nixon, he was evidently pleased--how could he not have been?--but exhibited no sense of complicity with the coup-makers themselves. As he said on the phone to Kissinger on September 16, "Well, we didn't--as you know--our hand doesn't show on this one though." To which Kissinger replied, "We didn't do it."”

The record suggests otherwise.

Falcoff goes on to aver that the right-wing dictatorship which followed and which crushed “not merely the Allende regime, but Chilean democracy itself” “was not and could not have been predicted”. That was why it was so important for him to omit earlier in his article the US nurturing of far right political forces in Chile. That is also why it is so vital for him to minimise the US involvement in Chile from the years 1970-73.Take, for example, Patria Y Libertad, mentioned earlier. They were, it seems, a CIA-sponsored organisation from the beginning, whose men were trained in guerrilla warfare and bombing techniques at schools in Bolivia and Los Fresnos, Texas. The CIA were busy funding them when they were marching down Chile’s streets in full riot gear, engaging repeatedly in acts of violence and provocation, and calling for a military coup. Coincidence? (Senate Report, p 31; For further information about the Texas bombing school, see William Blum, Killing Hope, p 202).

Falcoff concludes where he began – blithely asserting something sinister about Allende’s “regime”, it’s likely abolition of democracy, and its deathlike creep toward communist totalitarianism, which may have descended earlier were it not for “American subventions”. Many of these arguments resemble, and perhaps owe themselves to, the discredited output of the CIA agent, Robert Moss, whose book Chile’s Marxist Experiment, written in 1973, has been circulated widely by the Pinochet putschists to justify the coup. Suffice to say, it is crammed with “myths that will not die” which at least have the virtue of being better fiction than Falcoff’s dreary apologetics.